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LICENSING OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORTATION
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t
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PART I
I. INTRODUCTION

T

HIS study is concerned with the licensing of domestic air transport
operations by the Civil Aeronautics Board.' The issuance of permits
to foreign airlines to operate in the United States and the certification
of United States carriers to engage in international and overseas operations have been excluded. The unique problems presented by such international aspects require participation by federal instrumentalities other
than the Board and would enlarge considerably the scope of the study. It
should be noted, however, that there are many common elements in
domestic and international certification proceedings.
As in the study of ICC truck licensing,' this work begins with a consideration of the substantive policies and economic factors relating to airline licensing: the needs the licensing process must fulfill and the conditions
under which it must operate (Chapters II, III, and IV). Attention is then
directed to the manner in which the process is organized (Chapter V), tle
successive steps involved in processing formal route cases (Chapter VI), and
the instances in which operating authority is granted pursuant to informal
procedures (Chapter VII). And in order to facilitate an understanding of
how the over-all process works, a single route proceeding, the St. LouisSoutheast Service case, is followed from beginning to end (Chapter VIII).
The descriptive materials conclude with a summary of processing times
and volume of CAB licensing matters (Chapter IX).
The remainder of the study is devoted to proposals to improve the
licensing process-some recommended and others not (Part II).
Among the recommendations here advanced are suggestions directed at
(1) the articulation of findings in initiating route proceedings, (2) the
methods by which the scope of route proceedings is defined, (3) delegations of decisional authority in formal proceedings, (4) the role of staff
assistance in reaching decisions and preparing opinions at the Board level,
ond (5) the separation of various components of the Board's staff from
t A special report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States.

tt Professor of Law, Columbia University; A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1954, Columbia University; Law

Clerk to Hon. Tom C. Clark, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, 1954-55; Office of
General Counsel to Secretary of the Air Force, D.C., 1955-56; Associate Professor of Law, Columbia
University, 1959-62.
1 For other studies bearing on the licensing of domestic air transportation and CAB practices,
see McKinsey and Company, Increasing the Effectiveness of the Civil Aeronautics Board (1960);
CAB Comments of the Civil Aeronautics Board on the Hector Memorandum to the President
(1960); Task Force on National Aviation Goals, Report on National Aviation Goals: Project
Horizon (1961); United Research, Inc., Federal Regulation of the Domestic Air Transport Industry (1959); Richmond, Regulation and Competition in Air Transportation (1961); Fulda,
Competition in the Regulated Industries: Transportation (1961); Boyd, Improving the Administrative Process: A View From the CAB, 14 Ad. L. Bull. 108 (1961); Hale and Hale, Competition or
Control IV: Air Carriers, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (1961); Friendly, The Federal Administrative
Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1072 (1962).
2 Committee on Licenses and Authorizations of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, Report on Licensing of Truck Operations by the Interstate Commerce Commission (1962).
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one another. Recommendations are summarized in Chapter XI. Consideration has been given also to (a) the role of cross-examination in route pro-

ceedings, and (b) the degree of hearing examiner "independence" from
the Board (Part II); but no definite recommendations concerning these
matters have been advanced in this report.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF FEDERAL LICENSING OF

COMMERCIAL AVIATION

Licensing functions relating to commercial aviation are divided between
two federal instrumentalities: the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal
Aviation Agency. The Agency has primary responsibility for the licensing
of equipment, personnel, and facilities in order to assure safety in both
commercial and noncommercial air operations. Its functions are beyond
the scope of this study. The Board has the primary responsibility for
economic regulation of commercial air carriers, including the licensing of
new operations by such carriers. The Board's approval is required to transport persons or property in interstate commerce as a "common carrier" by
air. The CAB has broadly construed the scope of "common carrier," so
that virtually all commercial aviation is subject to its licensing authority.4
Even so, the Board now seeks legislation which would subject air "contract
carriers" to its economic controls.!

A. The Background Of The Licensing Provisions
The statutory framework of contemporary economic licensing emerged
in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the successor of a number of federal
statutes which had defined in varying ways the role of the federal government in shaping the economic regime of air transportation! The 1938
legislation attempted to provide a comprehensive framework of federal
control over domestic commercial aviation by giving the Civil Aeronautics
Authority (later the CAB) power to:
(1) Control entry into air transportation by common carriers engaged
in interstate commerce;
(2) Control mergers and other relations among such air carriers and
either (a) other transportation media or (b) other aeronautics companies;
(3) Regulate both the maximum and minimum rates of such air carriers;
(4) Award subsidies, in the form of mail pay, to such air carriers; and
(5) Require adequate service by such air carriers, and otherwise regulate their operations.
The background of the act was a financial crisis in the air transport industry in the late 1930's. For a number of reasons, most air carriers
were in serious financial difficulties, some on the verge of bankruptcy.
Another cause for concern was the high degree of concentration in the
a 7 2 Stat. 737 (1958),

49 U.S.C. §§

1301(3),

1301(10),

1301(21)

(1958);

72 Stat. 754

(1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1958).
STransocean Air Lines, Inc., Enforcement Proceedings, 11 C.A.B. 350, 352 (1950); Las Vegas
Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, 7 Avi. 17,823 (1962) appeal pending.
One significant exception is Pacific Southwest Airlines, an intrastate air carrier not subject to
the Board's licensing authority. See Pacific-Southwest Local Services case, CAB Order No. E-17950
(Jan. 23, 1962) (hereinafter referred to by the number only).
5
CAB Ann. Rep. 10 (1961).
' For a detailed consideration of the legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
see W. K. Jones, Antitrust and Specific Economic Regulation: An Introduction to Comparative
Analysis, 19 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 261, 300-312 (1961).
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industry in 1938. The Big Four carriers-American, United, TWA, and
Eastern-accounted for roughly eighty per cent of revenue passenger-miles
and industry operating revenues. The bulk of the remaining scheduled
operations were in the hands of seven additional companies; and there
were about ten other, very small domestic scheduled airlines. Unscheduled
operators were not then economically significant.
Congress reviewed the situation with alarm, but the exact dimensions
of its fears are somewhat difficult to describe:
Would the financial crisis bankrupt all or such a large part of the industry that air transportation would vanish from the scene or be substantially diminished?
Would the larger airlines force the smaller carriers to the wall, leaving
an air transportation industry concentrated in the hands of the few large
survivors?
Would smaller operators invade the field in large numbers, with secondhand equipment and low-wage pilots, and drive out the established operators with their more expensive equipment and high overhead systems?
Would the airline system that emerged from the crisis be one which was
sufficiently well developed to meet the needs of national defense, sufficiently
modern and expensive to meet the demands of national pride, sufficiently
stable in its growth to protect the investments and wages of existing entrepreneurs and employees, sufficiently profitable in its operations to assure
sustained and costly attention to improvement of air safety, and sufficiently broad in its scope to provide service on low-density as well as highdensity routes?
If not united with one another as to the cause for concern, the proponents of more comprehensive air carrier regulation at least found unity
in their fear of an uncharted future. The common agreement was that
all of the unpleasant prospects that were worrying any of the affected interests should be the subject of regulatory concern.
B. Statutory Standards For Air Carrier Licensing
The diverse and sometimes conflicting motivations of the various congressional proponents found their way into the act itself. The Board is
directed to
consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest,
and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system
properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national
defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize
and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety
in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers:
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructvie competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development
of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign
and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the
national defense;
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(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics.'
The licensing provisions of the act were viewed as the most significant
in carrying out these purposes. They were three in number.
First, there was a grandfather provision assuring certification for air
carriers in operation in 1938 unless their services were "inadequate and
inefficient." 8
Second, new common carrier operations might be certificated if, after
notice and hearing, the Board found (1) that the applicant was "fit,
willing, and able to perform such transportation properly, and to conform
to the provisions of the act and the rules, regulations, and requirements"
thereunder, and (2) that the transportation was "required by the public
convenience and necessity."'
Finally the Board was empowered to exempt from all or part of the
act or any regulations thereunder "any air carrier or class of air carriers"
if it found that the enforcement of any such measures "would be an undue burden on such air carrier or class of air carriers by reason of the
limited extent of, or unusual circumstances affecting, the operations of
such air carrier or class of air carriers and is not in the public interest.""
While perhaps not of great significance at the outset, the provision has
been widely utilized as a source of operating authority. The Board is presently seeking legislation to broaden and clarify its exemption powers.
In addition, the licensing of air carriers was influenced by the provision
governing subsidy, which provided that each carrier would receive mail
pay, over and above the cost of carrying the mail, "sufficient . . . together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier
under honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the
character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the
Postal Service, and the national defense."'" In effect, the certificated carrier
is assured reimbursement of costs and a reasonable return on its investment
for services considered by the Board to be in the public interest. The subsidy element is distinguished from "service mail pay," which is based on
the costs of transporting the mail. The two are now stated separately in
making payments," and the Board has been seeking legislation requiring
even greater separation between these mail pay items."
C. Components Of The Air TransportationIndustry
Within this statutory framework, the domestic air transportation industry has developed in its several distinct branches.
The domestic carriers in existence in 1938 have become known as the
domestic trunkline carriers. Principally, they serve long-haul markets and
heavily traveled segments between major cities.1' However, they also serve
a number of minor points, including some low-density, short-haul markets.
772 Stat. 740 (1958),

49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
repealed 72 Stat. 806 (1958).
11371(d) (1) (1958).
972 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C.
"072 Stat. 771 (1958), 49 U.S.C. 51386(b) (1) (1958).
"CAB Ann. Rep. 12 (1961).
"272 Star. 763 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1376(b) (1958).
1172 Stat. 763 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1376(c) (1958).
"CAB Ann. Rep. 10 (1961).
15 CAB Ann. Rep. 25 (1955).
849 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1),

DOMESTIC LICENSING: THE CAB
No trunkline carrier has received mail pay subsidy for several years, 16 and
the Board has proposed legislation which would make them ineligible for
subsidy." No carriers, other than the original grandfather lines, have been
certificated to engage in domestic trunkline service." s There remain eleven
carriers in this group. The group continues to be characterized by considerable discrepancy in size between the Big Four and the seven smaller
trunklines.
During the 1940's there developed a number of additional lines, designed principally to connect smaller population centers with one another
19
and with nearby major cities. Later described as local service carriers,
these lines originally received only temporary authority and their status
was regarded as experimental."0 In 195 5, Congress conferred limited grandfather rights on these airlines with the result that pemanent certificates replaced many of the temporary authorizations."1 Subsidized since
their inception, the local service carriers consume the largest share of current subsidy-estimated at 58.9 million dollars for fiscal 1961 for the
thirteen local service carriers operating within the continental United
States."2
The grant of statehood to Alaska and Hawaii has resulted in the reclassification of a number of territorial carriers as local service carriers."
Two such carriers operate wholly within Hawaii with the benefit of subsidy. Eleven airlines operate within Alaska: one is ineligible for subsidy,
one was not subsidized in fiscal 1961 though eligible, and the nine remaining received subsidy. The total subsidy for Alaskan4 and Hawaiian
carriers for fiscal 1961 is estimated at 9.6 million dollars.
After World War II, there arose a group of non-scheduled airlines,
operating under general exemptions previously promulgated by the Board."
After first attempting to suppress their operations," the Board in 1955
decided that there was room in the air transportation industry for a class
of carriers which did not maintain regular route patterns but specialized
in charter operations and in limited, individually ticketed flights required
by peak traffic demands.' The non-scheduled airlines were originally
described as large irregular carriers and are now known as supplemental
air carriers.Successive efforts by the Board to authorize their operations on
a permanent basis, first by exemption and then by certification, were reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." For some
56

CAB Ann. Rep. 18 (1959); CAB Ann. Rep. 23 (1960); CAB Ann. Rep. 31 (1961).
Ann. Rep. 9 (1961).
" Hearings Before Antitrust Subcommittee of House Committee on judiciary pursuant to H.
Res. 107, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 944-949 (1956).
9
1 CAB Ann. Rep. 24 (1955).
" Service in Rocky Mountain States Area, 6 C.A.B. 695, 730 (1946).
21 69 Stat. 49 (1955), repealed, 72 Stat. 806 (1958); Southwest Airways Co., Permanent Certificate case, 21 C.A.B. 830 (1955).
22 CAB Ann. Rep. 32 (1961).
23 CAB Ann. Rep. 24 (1960).
24 CAB Ann. Rep. 32 (1961). There is some overlap among the carrier classifications. One of
the domestic trunklines-Continental--operates a local service system. And some trunkline services
are rendered by two of the Alaskan carriers and by United States international carriers.
" Investigation of Nonscheduled Air Services, 6 C.A.B. 1049, 1050 (1946).
"Large Irregular Carriers, Exemptions, 11 C.A.B. 609 (1950).
7
' Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 838 (1955).
5
" American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 235 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 905
(1957); United States Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 278 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, and case remanded, 364 U.S. 297 (1960).
17CAB
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time the status quo was maintained by interim legislation," and the Board
deferred action on applications for new supplemental authority while
more permanent legislative solutions were pending." New legislation has
recently been enacted providing for the transition of supplemental carriers to essentially all-charter operations (although the statute also makes
provision for grant of individually ticketed authority on a temporary
basis) ." Meanwhile the existing supplementals, operating without mail pay
subsidy, have been experiencing significant financial difficulties. There are
only about twenty such carriers still in operation.
Also since World War II, the Board has certificated, initially on a
temporarily basis, six all-cargo carriers to specialize in the movement of
air freight." These carriers have been authorized to carry mail on a nonsubsidy basis.' Today only three all-cargo carriers remain. In a recent
decision, the Board renewed two certificates on a permanent basis and one
on a temporary basis; denial of mail pay subsidy was reaffirmed. 4
Finally, the Board has authorized three experimental helicopter carriers
in different metropolitan areas."5 These receive subsidy under a congressionally imposed ceiling of six million dollars annually (estimated at

5.6 million dollars for fiscal 1961)." Their prospects are uncertain at the
present time. The Board also has authorized, by exemption, a class of air-

taxi operators,7 unsubsidized enterprises using small planes for services not
competitive with certificated operations employing helicopters or small
aircaft.
III.

CRITERIA FOR ENTRY INTO COMMERCIAL AvIATION:
RorrE CERTIFICATION

A. PreliminaryConsiderations
The statute requires that each applicant be "fit, willing, and able" (1)
to perform properly the transportation for which authority is requested
and (2) to conform to the various legal regulations of certificated operation."
The first element is met by showing (a) a proper organizational basis

for the proposed operation, (b) adequate financial resources, and (c) a
plan for conducting the air operation in question."9 The final requirement
has been largely diluted in recent years because of the difficulty of ascertaining, until the end of the proceeding, exactly what operations will be
authorized." In most instances, this element of fitness raises no problems.
The second aspect of fitness-conformity to regulatory requirements-

is determined by looking to past performance. Deliberate violations of the
74 Stat. 527 (1960).
Intercontinental U.S., Inc., Certificate Application for Domestic Supplemental Air Service,
E-17472 (Sept. 14, 1961).
a176 Star. 143 (1962); 49 U.S.C. 5 1371 (1962).
"Air Freight case, 10 C.A.B. 572 (1949).
"Airfreight Certificate Renewal case, 23 C.A.B. 186 (1956), airmred sub noom; Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. CAB 247 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1957).
"Domestic Cargo-Mail Service case, E-18300 (May 3, 1962).
"CAB Ann. Rep. 20 (1961).
'4 CAB Ann. Rep. 32 (1961).
'7 14 C.F.R. § 298.
a872 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. S 1371(d) (1) (1963).
"American Export Airlines, Inc., Temporary Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,
3 C.A.B. 294, 298 (1941); *Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 147 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
4°Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 277 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
29
20
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statutes or regulations administered by the Board may be held to demonstrate a lack of compliance disposition and result in disqualification of the
applicant. 1 But the Board also considers the need for the applicant's service in passing on the question of qualification, and seemingly does not regard the bar created by past violations to be absolute. 2 In practice, this
ground has been invoked most significanty in denying route authority to
unscheduled operators.

B. Public Convenience And Necessity
The determination of public convenience and necessity in route cases
is thought to involve two major questions: (1) Should new service be authorized? (2) If so, by whom should the service be rendered? "' This twostep approach has some uses and some advantages, but formulation of the
problem in these terms may be deceptive.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that the answer to both questions is
related to the response to still another query: What is the nature of the
primary air transportation market in which new authority is sought? Is it
the kind of market in which local service is most appropriate? Or is
trunkline service the more suitable?"' Since the answer to this inquiry is
clear or assumed at the outset in many cases, the issue often is not explicitly raised.
1. Local Service Routes
If local service is involved, the route sought may well be one not previously served by any air carrier. Estimates will be made of the volume
of traffic likely to be generated, and the importance of air service to communities on the route will be assessed. The crucial questions concern: (1)
the cost of the various services sought, as rendered by different carriers,
in terms of mail pay subsidy;4 and (2) the selection of carriers and communities which will provide a maximum of needed air transportation for

a minimum of subsidy cost."' The Board has adopted a policy of certificating doubtful points, whether on a temporary or permanent basis, subject to a "use it or lose it" policy,47 i.e., communities must enplane an
average of five passengers daily over a twelve-month period (after the
first six months of operation) or face loss of air service. Exceptions are
made of special cases, where, because of isolation or defense considerations,
service may be permitted despite light traffic. Utilization above the five
passenger minimum may be so marginal as still to be questioned, and entire segments may be deleted if less than seven passengers per flight are

averaged. The "use it or lose it" standards are applied in cases initiated by
the Board and also in cases where authority to serve temporarily certificated
points is sought to be renewed.
An effort is made to avoid competition among local service carriers and
between local service and trunkline carriers.4' And the Board has been
"' New York-Chicago Service case, 22 C.A.B. 973, 990 (1955).
"'Hawaiian International Service, 10 C.A.B. 62 (1948).
"Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-elect 41 (1960).
"Piedmont
Certificate Renewal case, 15 C.A.B. 736, 810 (1952); Pacific-Southwest Local
Service case, E-17950 (Jan. 23, 1962).
41 Reopened Additional California-Nevada Service case, 15 C.A.B. 11, 18 (1952).
' American Airlines, Inc., Chicago-Detroit, Route 7 Local Service case, 20 C.A.B. 565, 571
(1955); Service to Fayetteville, Arkansas, 19 C.A.B. 25, 27 (1954).
4 Seven States Area Investigation, E-13254 (Dec. 8, 1958).
4s Piedmont Certificate Renewal case, 15 C.A.B. 736, 811 (1952). But see Syracuse-New York
City case, 24 C.A.B. 770 (1957); Trans World Airlines, Inc.; Removal of Santa Fe-Albuquerque

Restriction, 16 C.A.B. 265 (1952).
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entertaining a number of proposals to substitute local for trunkline service at smaller points."
The issues of "what new service?" and "which new carrier?" are closely
related." A decision to provide service between a sequence of towns-A,
B, and C-may lead to the selection of Carrier No. 1, since the service can
most economically be added to its route pattern. This may mean that an
additional town of a marginal sort-D-may also be served, since it is
well situated with respect to the service Carrier No. 1 will render to A,
B, and C. On the other hand, if Carrier No. 2 were selected to serve A,
B, and C, the cost would be a little more, but points E and F could conveniently be added. As a practical matter therefore, the choice may be
between: (1) Carrier No. 1, points A, B, C, and D, and a particular subsidy figure; and (2) Carrier No. 2, points A, B, C, E, and F, and a different subsidy figure. The possible variations are quite extensive when consideration is given to joining the new segment with the carrier's existing
route pattern.
2. Trunkline Routes
With respect to trunkline carriers, the issues are somewhat different because (1) no direct subsidy costs are involved, and (2) competitive services may be authorized. In fact, most trunkline cases in recent years have
involved applications for competitive service. Briefly summarized, the
issues are likely to take this form:
(a) One or more markets will attract interest because of their substantial
traffic, and a number of applications will be made seeking to participate
in the traffic. The first question is whether the traffic is substantial enough
to be likely to provide support for additional air service." No precise figure has been established to mark this likelihood. Recently, however, the
Board considered whether to investigate markets in which competition had
been eliminated by the merger of Capital and United," with a view to
certificating a new competive carrier. Investigation was ordered where
Capital had been an effective competitor in markets exchanging an average of 100 or more passengers per day (but not in two 100-plus markets
where Capital had not been an effective competitor). Probably this figure
will vary widely depending on the general economic situation in the airline industry and the resolution of the next two considerations.
(b) If the supporting traffic is on the borderline, the Board is likely to
consider the manner in which the incumbent has developed the route:
frequency of schedules, availability of seats, type of equipment, promotional activities, development of coach service. If the incumbent scores
high, doubts usually will be resolved against new service;" if the score is
low, new service may well be authorized."' But it must be emphasized that
this step is concerned only with resolving doubts. If both the traffic and
"'Cincinnati-Detroit Suspension Investigation, E-15365 (June 10, 1960); CAB Ann. Rep
22-23 (1961).
59 Quad Cities-Twin Cities Service, 24 C.A.B. 654 (1957).
'I Southwest-Northeast Service case, 22 C.A.B. 52 (1955); Investigation of Service to WinstonSalem and/or Greensboro/High Point, 27 C.A.B. 113 (1958); cf. Continental Air Lines, Inc.Amendment of Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 1 C.A.A. 598 (1940).
" United Air Lines, Inc., Competitive Service Investigation, E-17217 (July 25, 1961).
" Mississippi Valley case, 8 C.A.B. 726, 733 (1947); Chicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities case,
E-13890, (May 19, 1959).
"Pacific-Southwest Local Service case, E-17950 (Jan. 23, 1962). Cf. Eastern Route Consolidation case, 25 C.A.B. 215, 217 (1957).
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existing service are poor, the incumbent may be confronted with a directive to render adequate service rather than certification of a competitor."
If both the traffic and existing service are good, a new carrier may be
certificated nonetheless.s
(c) Another factor of significance, particularly in borderline situations,
is the identity of the incumbent and the importance of the route to its
financial well-being. The Board is likely to be less concerned about diverting traffic from one of the Big Four than from one of the smaller trunks
or a local service carrier. In any proceeding the amount of probable
diversion will be considered, and it may be controlling where it is substantial enough to threaten the financial position of a weak carrier (or
to increase the subsidy need for a local service carrier).
(d) If the first three points, considered together, point to a new authorization, the Board considers the feasibility of service by various applicants. New service is not rendered in a vacuum, and the Board has to
satisfy itself that one or more carriers are so situated with respect to routes,
facilities, and equipment as to be able to conduct an economically feasible
operation."8 As among the competing applicants who are eligible, a number
of considerations are taken into account in making the selection:
(i) Integration of the new authority with the old is an important consideration. " First, the convenient location of existing facilities may mean
that the new service can be rendered more efficiently and economically."
Second, the existence of traffic flows over existing routes, which can be
channeled into the new routes, may permit more extensive and economical
development of the new route, since traffic levels over the latter will be
higher than that for other carriers." Third, the existence of the new authority may permit changes in scheduling and equipment utilization which
will make possible improvement of service on the old routes."5
(ii) Related to this is the applicant's "historic participation" in the
traffic. In order to encourage carriers to build up traffic on their routes and
to minimize disruption of existing traffic relations, the Board will give
some weight to the carrier's prior participation in the traffic in question,
either as a connecting carrier or a more circuitous carrier."3 Thus American
recently was selected" as a third nonstop carrier between New York and
San Francisco because it had participated in the New York-San Francisco
traffic on its transcontinental route through Chicago; Northwest, the rejected applicant, was a complete stranger to San Francisco.
(iii) Pointing in a different direction is the Board's policy of strengthening the smaller trunkline carriers, attempting to balance the industry
s' Flint-Grand Rapids, Adequacy of Service Investigation, E-15161 (April 29, 1960).
as Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., Additional North-South California Service, 4 C.A.B.
373, 375 (1943); Southwest-Northeast Service case, 22 C.A.B. 52, 60 (1955).
57 Great Lakes-Southeast Service case, 27 C.A.B. 829, 839-841 (1958); Southern Transcontinental
Service case, E-16500 (March 13, 1961), appeal pending.
as Southern Transcontinental Service case, E-16500 (March 13, 1961), appeal pending.
asTrans-Southern Airlines, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 2 C.A.B.
250, 271 (1940); Delta Air Corporation---Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 2
C.A.B. 447, 468 (1941).
0 New York-San Francisco Nonstop Service case, E-14412 (Sept. 2, 1959).
1
" New York-Florida case, 24 C.A.B. 94, 100 (1956); Great Lakes-Southeast Service case, 27
C.A.B. 829, 838 (1958).
e'Middle Atlantic Area case, 9 C.A.B. 131, 144 (1948).
eaChicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities case, E-13890 (May 19, 1959); Denver Service case, 22
C.A.B. 1178, 1183 (195 5). But see Great Lakes-Southeast Service case, 27 C.A.B. 829, 837 (1958).
"4New York-San Francisco Nonstop Service case, E-14412 (Sept. 2, 1959).
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by equalizing to some extent the strong and the weak. This may involve
the injection of a smaller trunkline, with a limited system, into an entirely
new market. This factor received particular emphasis in a series of decisions in the mid-1950's which granted extensive new route authority
to the smaller trunklines, particularly in long-haul, high-density markets."
Actually a similar attitude probably has been present in more generalized
form throughout the administration of the act. It is difficult to review a
series of route cases without coming to the conclusion that the Board is
endeavoring to distribute desirable routes among all the existing trunklines, big and small, so that none will feel neglected. This may be described
as maintaining "balance" in the industry; but this approach also maintains
the status quo to a large extent and the good will of the existing carriers
toward the Board.
(iv) The Board also considers the operational policies of the different
carriers, choosing a specialist in coach service if that is the most glaring
deficiency in the market under consideration "° or choosing a regional carrier
if the traffic to be served lies wholly or primarily within that carrier's
region." This probably is not one of the stronger factors, and it seems to
be advanced most often in support of decisions resting on other grounds.
The same observation may be made as regards many of the other factors
found in Board opinions.
(v) Finally, the Board has to consider what other services will be made
possible as an incident to selecting one carrier over another for the major market needs. Each carrier has a different route system and, absent
express restriction, the carrier selected may render service between the
newly awarded points and any of its existing authorized points as long
as junction points are observed (mandatory stops where different routes
or segments are joined)." Thus the selection of each carrier brings
with it different new services to and from other points on that carrier's
routes. This may be good or bad. If the new combinations are worthy
of service and presently have none, this is a factor in the carrier's favor. If
the new combinations already have ample service, and the addition of the
applicant will lead to "excessive" competition, this is a negative factoralthough one which may sometimes be eliminated by an appropriate restriction. "
Once again, the questions of selection of route and selection of carrier
are intermingled. Although the issues may be divided for consideration,
the separation, while valid in terms of emphasis, is never complete. For
the choice in the last analysis is between one carrier with an existing route
system and a consequent "package" of city pairs which will be served, and
another carrier with a different route structure and a different "package"
of city pairs. Indeed, even the usual emphasis may be reversed, and instead
"'New York-Chicago Service case, 22 C.A.B.

973

(1955); Denver Service case, 22 C.A.B.

1178 (1955); Southwest-Northeast Service case, 22 C.A.B. 52 (1955).
"6Reopened Milwaukee-Chicago-New York Restriction case, 21 C.A.B.

760

(1955);

New

York-Chicago Service case, 22 C.A.B. 973, 918 (1955).
07 Braniff Airways, Inc., Memphis-Oklahoma City-El Paso Service, 6 C.A.B. 169, 180 (1944);
New York-Chicago Service case, 22 C.A.B. 973, 978 (1955).
" North Central case, 7 C.A.B. 639, 650 (1946).
" Reopened Milwaukee-Chicago-New York Restriction case, 21 C.A.B. 760, 764 (1955);
Service by Western Air Lines, Inc. to Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 20 C.A.B. 757, 758 (1955);
New York-Chicago Service case, 22 C.A.B. 973 (1955); Southwest-Northeast Service case, 22
C.A.B. 52 (1955).
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of starting with a route that needs a new carrier the Board may begin with
a carrier that needs new route authority.
The more conventional cases coming under this heading are the route
consolidation cases, where a carrier seeks the consolidation of separate
routes by: (1) elimination of a junction point, making non-stop operation
possible; 0 (2) transformation of common points on separate routes into
intermediate points on a single route for the same purpose;" or (3) certification of a new intermediate point to unite separate routes into a single
route." Where the consolidation will not result in duplication of existing
service, the primary focus is on the effect of the applicant's proposal in reducing its costs and facilitating better service. 7" Where duplication will
result, the Board has required that a need for improved service be shown
and that diversion from existing carriers be weighed against the factors
favoring the route consolidation.74 Even so, the primary impetus for the
new authority comes, not from the demand for new service, but from the
carriers' attempt to achieve greater operating efficiency.
In a less conventional setting, the Board on occasion may have injected
a new carrier into a route for reasons other than the need for new services
on that route. Thus in 1956 the Board certificated Northeast 75-the only
trunkline then still on subsidy-into the lucrative New York-Miami
market for five years. To be sure, the Board found a need for additional
competitive service. But the circumstances surrounding the case-the admittedly good development of the route by existing carriers, the rejection
of other applicants with seemingly superior claims, and the limited duration of the certificate-all seem to indicate that the principal impetus for
the certification was the desire to get Northeast off subsidy.
This summary does not purport to be complete, nor to exhaust the
factors adduced by the Board in support of particular route awards. It
does, however, indicate the major types of considerations frequently advanced in deciding route cases.
IV. THE

ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF AIR CARRIER LICENSING

Domestic commercial aviation has made great strides since 1938. Even
so, it remains today a highly specialized transportation medium, accounting
for only a small minority of intercity freight and passenger traffic. Prospects for the future are the subject of considerable debate.
A. Development Of The Air TransportationIndustry
In the twenty-one years from 1939 to 1960, the transportation of all
forms of property by commercial air carrier within the United States increased 6,667 per cent from twelve million ton-miles" to roughly 800 million ton-miles." But the 1960 shipments (including small quantities of
private air transport) amounted to only 0.058 per cent of all intercity
5

" Eastern Route Consolidation case, 25 C.A.B. 215 (1957).
7 American Airlines, Inc., Consolidation of Routes, 7 C.A.B. 337 (1946).
"' Delta Air Lines, Inc., Amendment of Certificate, 11 C.A.B. 18 (1949).
73 American Airlines, Inc., Consolidation of Routes, 7 C.A.B. 337 (1946).
74
Eastern Route Consolidation case, 25 C.A.B. 215 (1957).
"New York-Florida case, 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956).
70
1CC Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, State No. 6103, Intercity Ton-Miles,
at 4 (1961).
1939-1959,
7
1ICC, Seventy-fifth Ann. Rep. 15 (1961).
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freight movements. 8 Over 99.9 per
8 cent of intercity frieght moved by rail,
truck, water carrier, or pipeline.
In the same twenty-one year period, domestic air passenger travel on
commercial aircraft increased almost 5,000 per cent from 683 million
revenue passenger-miles so to thirty-three billion revenue passenger-miles.8 '
But in 1960 the airlines accounted for only 4.38 per cent of all intercity
passenger travel."2 The 1960 totals for domestic intercity passenger-miles
are as follows: 8"
Transportation medium

.. ... ....... - - - - ..- ..----------Railroads ----------------------..
. .........-------------------------.
Motorbus ---------------------------------...............--------W aterways --------------------.-..-...
-- -----------..........
Commercial airlines --------.....
.923
. . .
..
.
. .-..
O ther aircraft
------Private automobiles ---------------...............--------

Passengermiles
(millions)

-

21,574
19,896
2,068
33,035

Share of pub- Share of
lic transit total transit

28.9
26.7
44.3

677,589

74,505
Total public transit --------680,580
Total private transit.................................
75Y,085
.....--------Total transit -------------------------------------

100.0

2.86
2.63
.27
4.38
.12
89.74
9.77
90.24

100.0

Traffic on inland waterways is treated as private transit, since division between public and
private is impracticable and the shares involved are extremely small.

As these figures indicate, the important characteristic of domestic air
transport is the large share it holds of public intercity passenger traffic. The
growth in this respect has been from 2.3 per cent in 1939" to 44.3 per cent
in 1960,"' giving commercial aviation a larger share of this traffic than any
other form of public transport; much of this is believed to be business
travel. 8 The dominance of the private automobile, however, has limited
the airlines' share of total intercity passenger movements: the growth has
been from 0.2 per cent in 1939"7 to 4.38 per cent in 1960."
Within the domestic air transport industry, passenger and freight movements have been shared by the various components of the industry in the
following proportions (figures are for fiscal 1961):8'
78

Ibid.

78Ibid.
5

" CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics 11-14 (1961).
0' In 1960 scheduled servcie accounted for 30.5 billion revenue passenger-miles. CAB Handbook
of Airline Statistics 11-14 (1961). Nonscheduled service by scheduled airlines totaled 0.54 billion
revenue passenger-miles, CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics 11-18 (1961). Based on statistics in
CAB Annual Report 76 (1961), for twelve months ended March 31, 1961, and statistics for twelve
months ended March 31, 1960, in CAB Annual Report 69 (1960), it is estimated that supplemental
air carriers accounted for 1.9 billion revenue passenger-miles in 1960. The total revenue passengermiles of these three forms of commercial air transportation was approximately thirty-three billion.
"' ICC, Seventy-fifth Ann. Rep. 15 (1961), supplemented by the computation in note 81 supra.

sa Ibid.
4

S ATA Facts and Figures 27
SSAuthorities cited notes 81,
SA recent survey conducted
of airline passengers are engaged
87ATA Facts and Figures 27
8 Authorities cited notes 81,
89
CAB Ann. Rep. 76 (1961).

(1961).
82 supra.
by the Fortune Market Research Department indicates that 59%
in business travel. Fortune Airline Study 5 (1961).
(1961).
82 supra.

DOMESTIC LICENSING: THE CAB

Component

Revenue
passengermiles

Share of
total
revenue
passengermiles

Billions

Billions

28.96
1.24

90.2
3.8

1.92
32.12

Domestic trunkline ---------------------------------------Local service and helicopter ------------------------------A ll-cargo .. .. .............................................Supplem ental ...................................................Total ------------------...........--------------------------

1

Cargo
ton-miles

Millions

Share of
total cargo
ton-miles

Millions
65.8
1.3

6.0

564.1
11.2
134.4
147.9

100.0

857.6

100.0

15.7
17.3

Cargo ton-miles include freight, express, excess baggage, and mail. Movements wholly within
Alaska and Hawaii have been excluded.

The following table shows the division of traffic among the eleven trunkline carriers, in annual revenue passenger-miles, in shares of domestic
trunkline traffic, and in shares of industry traffic."0

Trunkline carrier

Revenue
passengermiles
(12 months
ended
Oct. 31,

Per cent of Per cent of
trunkline
industry
revenue
revenue
passengerpassenger1
miles
miles

1961)
Thousands
American ----------------------.....---------------------------.
5,896,075
19.8
17.8
B raniff -------------------------------------------------------------------------.
1,04 9,34 9
3.6
3.2
Continental ----------------------.......-------------------------- - 880,596
3.0
2.7
D elta ............................................
2,127,421
7.2
6.5
Eastern
-------------------------------------3,941,257
13.8
12.4
N ational ----------------..............---- - - ---------.1,071,821
-------..
3.7
3.3
Northeast ---------------------------------------------------------------- 723,791
2.5
2.3
Northwest ----------------------------------------------------------1,011,290
3.J
3.2
TW A - - - - - ------------------------------------------------------- ---..-- - 4,223,832
14.5
13.1
Uniteda------------------------------------------------7,463,49 5
25.5
23.0
Western -------------------------------.-.------.. .... ......
839,29 5
2.9
2.6
Total -------------------........----------------------------------------

29,228,222

100.0

90.0

Percentage of trunkline revenue passenger-miles was multiplied by 0.9, since trunklines account
for approximately 90 per cent of industry revenue passenger-miles.
' Figures include traffic of Capital applicable to periods prior to Capital's merger with United on
June 1, 1961.

The Big Four accounts for some 73.6 per cent of domestic trunkline passenger traffic and 66.3 per cent of the total domestic passenger traffic. These
percentages may be compared with the eighty per cent share of the Big Four
when regulation was first imposed in 193 8. "' Despite the Board's policy of
strengthening the weaker trunklines, the Big Four remain dominant both
among the trunklines and in the industry as a whole. The modest dilution
that has occurred in the Big Four's share of industry traffic is as much the
consequence of introducing new components into the industry (local service and supplementals) as it is attributable to strengthening the weaker
90 Letter from Mr. William Weinfeld, Chief, Research and Statistics Division, Office of Carrier
Accounts and Statistics, CAB, to Professor W. K. Jones, dated Feb. 16, 1962.
" W. K. Jones, Antitrust and Specific Economic Regulation: An Introduction to Comparative
Analysis, 19 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 261, 304 (1961).
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trunks. And yet the Board's policy of strengthening the weaker trunks,
coupled with other factors, has led to extensive point-to-point competition among trunkline carriers.
In the following table there are set forth trunkline schedules for the
100 city-pairs accounting for the largest number of revenue passengermiles in 1960." Some authorizations may be restricted, thereby limiting
the number of schedules which may be offered by an individual carrier; in
other instances authorizations may not be fully utilized.
Number of trunklines offering schedules Number and nature of city-pairs
3 (the New York-Washington-Boston tri5 or more nonstop -----------------------------angle).
4 (3 in the top 10 city-pairs).
...........--------------------4 nonstop ----------------22 (14 in the top 45 city-pairs).
3 nonstop ----------------------------------------2 nonstop, plus 1 or more significant
8 (scattered).
--------------------1-stop
23 (scattered).
-------------------2 nonstop
1 nonstop, plus 1 or more significant
17 (scattered).
-------------------1-stop
10 (7 in the bottom half of the 100 cityMore than 1 multistop -----------------------

1 nonstop
1 multistop

--------------------------------------

pairs).
4 (all in bottom 22 city-pairs).
9 (7 in bottom 20 city-pairs).

To place these figures in perspective, consideration must be given to the
nature of these city-pairs. Two factors are of importance:
(1) The average number of revenue passengers moving over the segment each day-this indicates the density of the movement and has an
obvious bearing on the practicability of multiple flights.
(2) The total revenue passenger-miles moving over the segment annually-this indicates the general revenue potential of the route, since
gross revenues vary roughly in proportion to revenue passenger-miles.
Of the 100 city-pairs which have the highest revenue passenger-miles
and, therefore, the highest revenue potential, seventeen generated less than
fifty passengers daily in each direction." If city-pairs are ranked in terms
of density (revenue passengers) rather than revenue potential (revenue
passenger-miles), the one hundredth shows an average daily passenger flow
of only eighty-one in each direction. 4 But this grouping contains many
short hauls which generate less revenue because they account for fewer
revenue passenger-miles.
Without attempting to set any precise outer limit, it is evident that
there are not an unusually large number of routes which, under current
traffic flows, are sufficiently lucrative (revenue passenger-miles) and sufficiently dense (revenue passengers) to support multiple carrier operations.
Under either measure the point is soon reached where average daily traffic
flows are well under 100 each way. With these figures comparison may be
made to the capacities of modern aviation equipment: jets capable of
" The 100 city-pairs in order of passenger-mile
Origin-Destination Survey, Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1960,
schedules for these city-pairs were obtained from Official
"3CAB Domestic Origin-Destination Survey, Jan.
(1961).
"4 Ibid.

rank were obtained from CAB, Domestic
vol. 1-13, Table 4 (1961). The trunkline
Airline Guide, North Am. ed. (Sept. 1961).
1 to Dec. 31, 1960, vol. 1-13, Table 4
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carrying between forty and 179 passengers;"' jet propeller craft with
capacities ranging from forty to ninety-eight;" large conventional aircraft
with capacities between forty and ninety-five; "' and the venerable DC-3,
which can carry twenty-one passengers.
It is possible, of course, for individual market flows to be combined by
a multistop flight servicing several markets. But this too carries important
implications: services in individual markets thus become closely interrelated, necessitating inquiries much broader than the service needs between
various isolated pairs of cities. In any case, the domestic trunkline appears
to be flying capacities which, at current passenger fares, substantially exceed the public's demand for accommodations. They reported that in 1961
they were able to fill only fifty-six per cent of available seats (a drop of 3.5
per cent from the previous year) ; and they ran losses amounting to roughly
thirty million dollars."
The development of the domestic trunkline market since World War II
is summarized in the next table, the numbered columns of which relate
the following information: (1) domestic revenue passenger-miles of domestic trunklines in scheduled service;" (2) percentage increase or decrease in such revenue passenger-miles over the previous year;1 ° (3)
domestic route miles operated by domestic trunklines;.1° (4) percentage
increase or decrease in such route miles over the previous year; (5) total
capital invested in domestic operations of domestic trunklines;5 " (6) rate
of return on such invested capital."'
(1)

Year
1945 ---1946 ..
1947---.-.-------1948 .
.
1949
__
1950
1951 ..
1952

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

.

Thousands
3,336,278
5,903,111
6,016,257
5,840,211
6,570,726
7,766,008
10,210,726

(2)
54.4
76.9
1.9
-2.9
12.5
18.2
31.5

(3)
42,486
48,168
51,066
54,622
55,643
56,072
55,867

(5)

(4)

11.0
6.01
6.96
1.88
.77
-. 36
51

(6)

Thousands
$168,135
256,957
299,439
319,132
321,218
335,744
353,248

- 1.91
-- 4.57
1.74
5.75
12.31
13.44

417,421

14.19

486,208

11.22

12,120,789

18.7

55,583

-.

14,297,581

18.0

54,525

-1.90

1954-16,234,638

13.5

54,354

-.

31

522,470

11.21

19,205,675
21,643,140
24,499,510
24,435,657
28,127,216
29,233,199

18.3
12.7
13.2
-. 3
15.1
3.9

54,997
58,376
60,693
61,341
63,396
63,265

1.18
6.11
3.97
1.07
3.35
-. 21

589,861
711,159
903,668
1,006,858
1,320,673
1,579,640

11.85
9.57
4.80
6.49
7.12
2.79

" Passengers: Boeing 707, 121-179; Boeing 720, 149; Convair 880, 84-110; DC-8, 118-176;
Caravelle, 64-80. The figures in this and succeeding footnotes are taken from various editions of
Jane's All the World's Aircraft.
's Passengers: Fairchild F-27, 40; Lockheed Electra, 66-98; Vickers Viscount, 40-59.
"' Passengers: Convair 240, 40; Convair 340, 44; Convair 440, 44-52; DC-6, 82; DC-7, 95;
Lockheed Constellation, 94; Lockheed Super G, 92; Martin 404, 40.
" ATA Press Release, Jan. 1, 1962.
" CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics 11-14 (1961).
'00 CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics II-15 (1961).
'0' Letter from Mr. William Weinfeld, Chief, Research and Statistics Division, Office of Carrier
Accounts and Statistics, Civil Aeronautics Board, to Professor W. K. Jones, dated Feb. 16, 1962.
This figure is the net certificated domestic route mileage of the domestic trunkline carriers,
being a total of the shortest distance connecting all of the points served by each individual carrier
on all of its routes along flight paths authorized in its certificate of public convenience and
necessity. Duplication is removed for each carrier's routes but not as between different carriers.
The data are weighted for the time element involved in route changes.
i°2CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics 11-64 (1961).
'0a The figures for 1946 through 1950 were obtained from the Initial Decision of Examiner Ralph
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From columns (1), (3), and (5) it is evident that over the entire postwar period substantial growth has occurred in domestic trunkline traffic,
route mileage and investment. But columns (2), (4), and (6) illustrate
the erratic nature of this growth and the impact on domestic trunkline
profits. While other factors, such as equipment capacity and operating
expenses, undoubtedly affect the profit margins of the trunklines, it seems
evident that traffic growth has a positive effect on such profits and new
route mileage a negative effect.
B. Prospects For The Future
The probable direction of future air carrier licensing can be discussed in
terms of the two major branches of the industry.
1. Local Service
Applications for the extension of local service operations place the Board
between two significant political pressures. On the one hand, there is always
opposition to lavish disbursements of the taxpayers' money in the form of
mail pay subsidy. The Board's staff has been traditionally conservative on this issue. On the other hand, there is a strong desire for the extension of air service to smaller communities, particularly where satisfactory surface transportation is unavailable. These communities have articulate and forceful spokesmen in the Congress. The conflicting pressures probably will come to a head in the near future on two issues: deletion of communities presently receiving service, pursuant to the "use
it or lose it" policy; and determination of applications for a subsidized
"third-level" of air service to communities too small to be reached even
by the local service carriers. To date the Boad has received little guidance
from the Congress on how far it should go in expending the taxpayers'
dollars for rural air service.
2. Trunklines
With the advent of the jets-with their faster speed and greater capacity-the trunkline network is overextended in many places, at least
insofar as jet operations are concerned. The emphasis in coming years undoubtedly will be on transferring smaller cities to local service carriers
rather than introducing trunkline service into new markets, although this
is a highly controversial subject. There remains, however, the question of
whether (and to what extent) competitive services should be authorized
over segments admittedly suitable for trunkline operations. The present
inclination on this issue appears to be decidedly negative. Its future resolution will probably depend on:
(1) The magnitude of growth in traffic potential. At present traffic
levels, there seems to be little room for additional competitive service with
large-capacity equipment. Indeed, many of the markets which have such
service are unusually "thin."
(2) Conclusions about elasticity of demand for air transportation. If
the demand is highly elastic-i.e., many more passengers would travel at
lower fares-present traffic levels are not decisive. Additional competition
could be certificated to drive down fares and build up traffic. If, on the
L. Wiser in the General Passenger Fare Investigation, Doc. No. 8008 et al, Appendix No. 1, May
27, 1959. Figures for 1951 and later years were obtained from CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics
11-65 (1961).
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other hand, demand is inelastic--i.e., about the same number of passengers
would travel despite wide variations in fares-the benefits of extending
competitive services are less evident. Competition in nonprice mattersschedules, equipment, service-can probably be effected by certifying two
carriers over important routes (as measured by present traffic standards) ;
and fares can be controlled by the Board. One difficulty is the lack of
systematic knowledge about the elasticity of demand for air transportation, particularly as it concerns long-run consumer preferences related to
general fare levels (as contrasted with the results of promotional fares in
particular markets).
(3) The Board's attitude toward subsidy. In addition to the overt subsidy received by local service carriers, it is generally recognized that many
airline services are internally subsidized, i.e., the trunklines serve small
cities or lean routes at a loss or with little profit and make up the difference by charging higher fares than are necessary on the more heavily
traveled routes. '" If greater entry is permitted on the popular routes,
profits earned there will be forced down, making it impossible for the
trunks to subsidize internally their leaner routes. The Board has taken
actions in recent years inconsistent with the concept of internal subsidy:
certificating multiple carriers on monopoly routes formerly yielding high
profits to the monopolist; substituting local service carriers for trunklines
at smaller communities. On the other hand, the Board has sometimes
awarded profitable routes to local service carriers to aid them in reducing
subsidy' and has begun to compel "adequate service" in lean markets
0 Perhaps
neglected by recalcitrant trunklines."'
the safest escape from the
conflict between public subsidy costs and rural service demands is to augment the contributions of internal subsidy to leaner routes and to protect
profitable routes to facilitate such contributions. The Board can justify
this approach on the ground that internal cross-subsidization is a common
ingredient of most regulated pricing and some unregulated pricing. But
the significant appeal is the fact that a disguised tax and internal subsidy-in the form of protected profits on the more lucrative routes-is
evidently more acceptable politically than the overt taxes which must be
used to support government subsidies.
(4) The Board's concern about industry profits. Protection of high
profit routes may be needed to make feasible a policy of internal subsidization. Industry profits may also be an object of concern because of a number
of other views: that high profits are essential to an adequate safety program; or that such profits are essential to the introduction of new equipment styles at a rapid pace; or that the Board is responsible for the "health"
of the air carrier industry and that profits are a measure of such health.
These attitudes are of course promoted by the degree of identification
Board Members have with the industry. If these attitudes are strong, the
tendency would be to protect profits from the depressing effects of additional competition. By contrast a policy more imbued with competitive
spirit-willing to have prices and profits drop and to allow weaker or
104 Richmond, Regulation and Competition in Air Transportation

154-158 (1961).
105Syracuse-New York City case, 24 C.A.B. 770 (1957); Pacific-Southwest Local Service case,
E-17950 (Jan. 23, 1962).
0 Flint-Grand Rapids, Adequacy of Service Investigation, E-1 5166 (April 29, 1961) ; Washington-Baltimore, Adequacy of Service Investigation, E-15162 (April 29, 1961); Toledo, Adequacy
of Service Investigation, E-14629 (Nov. 10, 1959); Adequacy of Domestic Airline Service: The
Community's Role in a Changing Industry, 68 Yale L.J. 1199 (1959).
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ineffective carriers to fail-might point in the opposite direction. The situation may become confused, however, by a desire to preserve "competition"
as concretely embodied in the smaller trunklines, and to do so by sheltering
them from the adverse effects of the general decline in industry revenues
that might be prompted by additional licensing.
All of these issues involve complex interrelationships of fact and policy.
The factual elements are clearer in the first two; and the policy aspects
predominate in the latter two. But policy outlook certainly colors factual
appraisals; and factual premises or assumptions underlie the policy conclusions. The complexity of the relationships is difficult enough. More
troubling is the extent to which the facts are in doubt-or largely unknowable-and the extent to which the important issues of public policy
are left to resolution by the individual Board Member with little authoritative guidance from the Congress.
V.

ORGANIZATION OF THE LICENSING PROCESS

The ultimate responsibility for authorizing new domestic air transportation rests with the Civil Aeronautics Board, an independent regulatory
agency for five members appointed for staggered terms of six years each." '
The tenures of the current members of the Board are 10.8 years, 5.6
years, 2.1 years, 2.1 years, and ten months (as of December 31, 1961).
Their average tenure is 4.3 years; but it is only 2.9 years if the single tenyear member is excluded. The twenty-two prior Board members appointed
since 1938 had tenures averaging 4.2 years; but the average is only 2.8
years if three members with ten or more years of service are excluded. The
longest term recorded was 16.4 years. Three appointees served less than a
year. More than half of the twenty-seven past and present members of the
Board had experience in aviation regulation or in other economic regulation prior to their appointment to the Board: nine with the federal government, four with state governments, and three in nongovernmental
positions. The remaining eleven evidently had no prior experience directly
relevant to their duties on the Board.
Each Board member has one personal assistant-except the Chairman,
who has two. These are ungraded 17,000 dollar employees, except for
one with a GS-15 rating. Their average experience with the Board
is 7.4 years.' For additional professional assistance in the discharge of
their many duties, Board members must look to the general staff. The staff
components principally involved in licensing domestic air transportation
are as follows:
A. Bureau Of Economic Regulation
Headed by a Director (GS-18, 20.4 years)"' and a Deputy Director
(GS-17, 3.7 years),"' the Bureau is divided into three Divisions: (1)
Rates, (2) Subsidy, and (3) Routes and Agreements"' The Routes and
80772 Stat. 741 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1)
(1958); Statement of Organization and
Delegations of Final Authority, §§ 1.1, 1.2(a), 25 Fed. Reg. 657 (1960), as amended, 25 Fed. Feg.
12918 (1960), 26 Fed. Reg. 7231 (1961) (hereafter "Organization").
"' Unless otherwise indicated, time with the Board is as of Dec. 1, 1961, and includes absences
for military service.
"'Organization § 4.2; Delegations and Review of Action Under Delegation; Non-Hearing
Matters, 14 C.F.R. § 385.12 (hereafter "Delegation").
"' Organization § 4.5.
...Organization § 4.1.
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Agreements Division is the largest, and it plays an important role in the
licensing of new air transportation." 2 Its professional staff includes both
lawyers and economic analysts. The Chief of the Division (GS-17, 14.3
years) 11a is a lawyer. The Assistant Chief (GS-15, twenty years) is an
analyst. The Routes and Agreement Division is divided into five components:

1. Legal Staff
There are twenty authorized positions for attorneys on the Legal Staff.
Their functions are to act as Bureau Counsel in formal proceedings"4 and
to do other legal work connected with the processing of route cases. The
eighteen attorneys currently employed range from the Chief of the Staff
(GS-15, 10.1 years) and two attorneys with over fifteen years experience
(GS-14 and 13), to three attorneys who are with the Board for less than
a year (GS-9 and 11). There are two vacancies. Most of the attorneys are
in the GS- 11 to GS-13 range; their average time with the Board is 4.9
years.

2. Trunkline Section
There are fourteen authorized positions for analysts in the Trunkline Section. Their functions are to perform statistical and analytical work for the
Division, process informal matters, prepare exhibits and act as expert witnesses in formal proceedings, and otherwise assist Bureau Counsel in such
proceedings. In addition to domestic trunkline carriers, this section handles
matters related to United States international carriers and foreign air carriers. Counting the Section Chief (GS-15, 19.9 years), there are seven
analysts with ten or more years time with the Board. Only two have less
than two years experience. There is one vacancy. Six analysts are GS-12
to GS-15; four are GS-11; and three are GS-7. The average tenure of all
analysts is 9.5 years.

3. Local Service Section
There are sixteen authorized positions for analysts in this section. Their
functions are similar to those of the Trunkline Section analysts except that
they are concerned with local service carriers, helicopters, and territorial
carriers. Including the Section Chief (GS-15, 17.9 years), there are six
analysts with ten or more years time with the Board. Only one has less than
two years experience. There are three vacancies. The personnel are divided
into three groups of roughly equal size: GS-13 or higher, GS- I1 and GS-12,
and GS-7 and GS-9. Average tenure of all such analysts is 9.2 years.
4. CarrierServices Section
There are eight authorized positions for analysts in this section. Their
functions are the same as the other analysts considered except that they
are concerned principally with supplemental air carriers, charter authorizations, and freight forwarders. With the Section Chief (GS-15, 19.4 years),
there are three analysts with ten or more years of experience. Only one has
less than two years experience. There are two vacancies. Four of the analysts are GS-11, and two are GS-7. Their average tenure is 10.6 years.
Organization § 4.10.
SOrganization § 4.11; Delegation S 485.13.
,"4 Organization S 4.12.
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5. Agreements Section
This section is not concerned with initial licensing but with relations
among air carriers. Details on its composition are, therefore, omitted.
Considering the Division as a whole, the workload is divided very roughly as follows: domestic air carrier licensing, fifty per cent; other licensing
(primarily international), twenty per cent; and matters other than initial
licensing, thirty per cent. With respect to domestic licensing, the Bureau
spends a little more than twice as much time on formal proceedings as on
informal authorizations.
B. Bureau Of Hearing Examiners
Headed by a Chief Examiner, "' the Bureau has authorized twenty-four
positions for hearing examiners, all GS-15. Of the twenty examiners on
whom information is available, four have been CAB examiners for twenty
or more years and fourteen others for ten or more years. There are also
some vacancies and a recent appointee. The average tenure of the twenty
is 16.5 years, and they average another 5.6 years of specialized governmental experience related to their examiner function. All are appointed
pursuant to Section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act and their
primary function is to preside at formal evidentiary hearings and render
initial decisions based on the records made."' Except for a secretary, they
normally work without individually assigned assistance. About forty per
cent of the workload of all hearing examiners concerns the licensing of
domestic air transportation; another ten per cent involves other licensing,
primarily foreign and international carriers.
C. Office Of General Counsel
The General (GS-18, 23.2 years)'" and Deputy General Counsel (GS17, 14.9 years) head a legal office that is divided into four parts."' Portions
of two of these components have a direct relation to the licensing process.
In the immediate office of the General Counsel".. are a number of specialists in different subjects. One of these is the Special Counsel (Routes)
(GS-15, 21.5 years), who advises on novel and important questions concerning domestic route matters and is the principal coordinator on this
subject in relations among the Board, the Bureau, and other branches of
the office of General Counsel.
Two of the Divisions of the Office- (1) Rules and Legislation"'. and
(2) Litigation and Research''-are not specifically involved in the licensing process, but may contribute indirectly: the former by advising on
changes in rules and legislation affecting licensing activities; and the latter
(primarily concerned with defending Board orders in court) by engaging
in generalized research with respect to licensing problems.
The Opinion Writing Division, by contrast, is directly involved in the
licensing process, since its major responsibility is the drafting of Board
opinions and orders."' Headed by the Associate General Counsel, Opinion
"'. Organization

§§ 3.1, 3.2, 3.3; Delegation § 385.10.
5 385.11.

'..Organization
"'.Organization
..' Organization
"' Organization
"' Organization
.aaOrganization

§ 7.2, 7.3; Delegation
§ 7.1.
§ 7.2.
5 7.5.
5§ 7.7.
7.8.

"a Organization § 3.5, 3.8; Delegation

5
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Writing (GS-16, 13.6 years),"' the Division has an authorized strength
of twelve additional attorneys. The present staff of ten range from GS-12
to GS-14 and from complete newcomers to one attorney with almost
thirteen years with the Board. Their average tenure is 3.8 years. About
forty-five per cent of the workload of the Opinion Writing Division involves domestic route matters and another ten per cent is concerned with
international and foreign carrier licensing.
D. Other Board Components
Independent of the three previously described staff groups are a number
of additional units which also play a part in the licensing process.
Recently the Board established a Planning Office with an authorized
strength of three economists. Two are now on the premises (GS-16 and
GS-15). Although these economists do not participate in individual licensing proceedings, the general policies they formulate, if accepted, undoubtedly would have a significant impact on the Board's decisions on the
licensing of domestic air transport.
The Office of Carrier Accounts and Statistics is a substantial establishment concerned primarily with the collection and collation of statistical
data and with the auditing of carrier records."' Its impact on the licensing
process is twofold. First, the statistics and reports it disseminates are the
primary data-the raw material--on which other participants in the licensing process rely. Second, three of the direct participants in the licensing
process-Board Members, hearing examiners, and opinion writers-may
call upon this Office to provide special technical and analytical assistance.
It is estimated that special assistance in the latter category, involving primarily traffic analysts and accountants (GS-9 through GS-13), requires
four man-years of effort annually. The Office may also assign an analyst to
work directly with a hearing examiner on a particularly complex economic
case. This has occurred about once a year over the last several years.
The Executive Director of the Board plays an important role in management and personnel matters," 5 including suggestions for improvement
of processing methods; but he is not a direct participant in individual licensing cases. Similarly, the Director of the Office of Community and
Congressional Relations, while not a participant in the decisional process,
advises community representatives as to the most promising methods of
obtaining improved air service; and they in turn may trigger a licensing
proceeding.
VI. PROCESSING OF FORMAL ROUTE PROCEEDINGS

In roughly chronological sequence, the successive stages of a formal
route proceeding will be considered. Thereafter the processing of new
operating authority by informal methods will be briefly described.
A. The Decision Td Initiate Proceedings
Requests for additional air transportation may originate (1) with one
or more air carriers, through the filing of applications,"' or (2) with community interests seeking to obtain new or additional air service by the
'" Organization § 7.9.
24 Organization 5
6.1, 6.2.
12 Organization 5 2.3.
'6272
Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1958); 14 C.F.R.
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filing of community applications or by petitioning the Board to act with
respect to pending carrier applications." 7 Occasionally the Board may itself
originate a route proceeding, but normally such Board "initiation" follows,
rather than precedes, requests for service by carriers or communities."'
The selection of applications for processing involves important policy
determinations. In theory at least the Board used to process applications in
the order in which they were filed, although reserving power to make
exceptions and expedite later-filed cases where special reasons require their
early disposition. But the small number of route cases currently heard in
relation to the Board's large backlog of pending applications has tended
to make the exceptions more important than the general rule. And the
Board itself recently has announced that the policy of recognizing priority
of filing dates in assigning applications for hearing has been honored more
in the breach than in the observance."'9 The net result is that a proceeding
is not really started until a notice of prehearing conference (or some substitute) manifests Board intention to consider particular applications or
additional air transportation needs between designated points. It is the
Board and not the applicant which, in a realistic sense, controls the initiation of licensing proceedings.
The variations in methods of initiating proceedings are quite extensive.
They can usefully be considered under four headings:
1. Noticing Applications
Simplest in form is the assignment of a single application for prehearing
conference. This is accomplished by a notice of the Chief Examiner setting
forth the time and place of the conference and the identity of the presiding officer.' The Chief Examiner may also add a list of applications,
compiled from a review of the docket, which will be considered for consolidation with the principal application. The notice may be the result of
specific Board instructions or the product of the Chief Examiner's independent implementation of general Board policies.
Usually the notice does not identify the scope of the proceeding except
by its enumeration of one or more applications. On other occasions, where
the Chief Examiner is implementing fairly specific instructions of the
Board, there may be considerable definition in the initial notice. Thus the
Southern Rocky Mountain Area Local Service case was initiated by a
notice stating that it was "contemplated that this proceeding will cover
the local service pattern in the area bounded on the east by the cities of
Denver, Albuquerque, and El Paso; on the north by the cities of Denver,
Las Vegas, Salt Lake City, Reno, and San Diego; on the west by the Pacific
127 Municipal applicants proceed under 72 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (g) (1958), which
empowers the Board to amend a carrier's certificate upon petition or complaint. The act, however,
does not provide for municipal applicants as such. See Adequacy Of Domestic Airline Service: The
Community's Role In A Changing Industry, 68 Yale L.J. 1199 (1959).
.2.The Board's power to originate a route proceedings is based on 72 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C.
1371(g) (1958), which authorizes the Board, on its own initiative, to amend or modify a
carrier's certificate if it finds, after notice and hearing, that the public convenience and necessity
so requires; and also 72 Stat. 788 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(b) (1958), which authorizes the
Board to institute an investigation, on its own initiative, concerning any matter within its
jurisdiction.
.. Explanatory Statement, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, PDR-16, PSDR-2, 26 Fed. Reg.
11841 (1961).
'CAB
Rules of Practice in Economic Proceedings 23(a), 14 C.F.R. § 302.23 (a) (hereafter
"Rules of Practice").
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Ocean; and on the south by the United States-Mexican border.''. The
notice further stated that the scope of the proceeding might be modified
as a result of the conference, and that consideration would be given to
consolidation of a list of twenty-one applications. Notices of this nature
generally are the product of planning and formulation by the Bureau of
Economic Regulation.
2. Order of Investigation
Hearings upon applications may also be instituted by order of the Board
directing an investigation into air transportation requirements of specific
markets. 3' The docket may be reviewed to list applications which will be
considered for consolidation, but the scope of the proceeding is determined
independently of the applications, either by designating the terminal points
of markets (e.g., air service between Cleveland and New York) or by
defining the relevant area (e.g., in language similar to the Southern Rocky
Mountain case). The notice of prehearing conference follows shortly
thereafter simply to provide the time and place of the conference.
Orders of investigation generally originate as recommendations of the
Bureau of Economic Regulation, based upon the work of analysts in
studying the potential of markets for new air service. Such studies may be
precipitated by the suggestion of a Board Member or a member of the
staff, or they may emerge from the varied statistical work continually
carried on in the Bureau. The recommendation is sent to the Chief Examiner for concurrence or information and to the Special Counsel for
Routes in the General Counsel's office, before it is considered by the Board.
3. Order to Show Cause
The Board may, at the outset, not only define the scope of the proceeding, but also announce its tentative conclusions on the merits. The
initial order, prepared by the Bureau with the concurrence of the Chief
Examiner and the General Counsel (through the Special Counsel for
Routes), is one to "show cause" why the tentative conclusions should not
be adopted.' 3 This technique has not yet been used with great frequency
in route cases, and the exact manner of its use is not clearly defined. Its
origin and processing, however, are similar to those of an order of investigation except that it will require additional work on the Bureau's part
to formulate the tentative conclusions advanced and the supporting
statistical exhibits.
4. Motion to Expedite
Private parties-cities or carriers-may seek to influence the initiation
of processing by filing a motion to expedite the hearing of a particular application or group of applications."' The motion may be considered by the
Chief Examiner and a recommendation made by him to the Board, with
the concurrence of the Bureau requested; or the Chief Examiner may refer
the motion to the Bureau, particularly if reliance is placed on assertions as
to economic facts. The Bureau then makes a recommendation to the Board
requesting concurrence by the Chief Examiner. The Board ultimately de131 Doc. No. 5395 et al., Notice of Prehearing Conference, Feb. 4, 1960.
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. Rules of
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cides whether or not the matter should be expedited and issues an order
embodying its conclusion and stating findings of varying specificity." An
affirmative response to the motion will result in issuance of a notice of prehearing conference.
Extensive Board control over initiation of proceedings is probably inevitable because of a number of factors built into the structure of the
licensing process:
First, the Board's examiners-limited in number-are consolidated into
a single Bureau which must conduct hearings in all formal matters coming
before the Board,' of which route proceedings are but one class. Moreover, some of the other matters requiring hearings involve sufficient
urgency that normally they are accorded priority over applications for
new domestic authority: rate matters; mergers and agreements; enforcement proceedings; foreign air carrier permits; certificate renewals; and deletion of local service points pursuant to the "use it or lose it" policy. In
short, route applications must compete with other types of proceedings and
often the latter gain an overriding priority because of their international or
economic implications or the transitory nature of the transaction involved.
Second, applications for new air transportation authority do not give
rise to issues which can be settled once and for all. A route request which
yesterday was turned down because of economic unfeasibility may be
granted today if the governing economic factors have changed. Thus in
1961, in the Southern Transcontinental Service case, 137 the Board certificated two transcontinental air carriers across the southern tier of states,
granting authority which had been denied in 1951 in the Southern Service
to the West case' 38 and continually deferred throughout the 1950's (although some service was rendered via an interchange). Where it is fairly
apparent at the outset that a particular request for additional authority is
unlikely to be granted, the Board's limited hearing examiner resources can
be conserved by deferring consideration of the application until economic
factors become more propitious. Meanwhile, the examiners can act on applications which promise some chance of success. There are, for example,
helicopter applications pending since 1946,' upon which the Board feels
it could not act favorably until existing experimental helicopter services
demonstrate their economic feasibility. Instead of holding hearings and
denying helicopter applications as they are filed, year after year, the Board
has simply deferred consideration of pending applications until it feels
that there is some prospect of favorable action-or at least definitive action.
Only recently hearings have been initiated on some helicopter proposals. 4 '
Third, a number of factors combine to encumber the Board's docket
with large numbers of inactive applications. (1) Since applications are not
going to be heard for some time, there is an inducement to seek authority
which may be justified at a future date. Speculations as to future needs
obviously yield higher numbers of applications than convictions about
...See Additional Service to Fort Myers, Florida, by Eastern Air Lines, Inc., E-17447 (Sept. 13,
1961); Applications of Mackey Airlines, Inc., E-17745 (Nov. 20, 1961); Application of Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., for Removal of Restrictions Affecting Service to Milwaukee and the Twin Cities,
E-17678 (Nov. 9, 1961).
136Organization § 3.1.

la7 E-16500 (March 13, 1961), appeal pending.
'3312 C.A.B. 518 (1951).

'a" Bureau of Hearing Examiners, Docket Section, Report of Formal Economic Proceedings as
of Nov. 30, 1961, at 35 (1961).
140Washington, D.C., Helicopter Service case, Doc. No. 8458 et al.; CAB Ann. Rep. 21 (1961).
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present requirements. (2) Since the air transport industry is composed of
closely interacting units, an application by one airline is likely to precipitate applications by others to "protect" their interests in the area in question and express their desire to be heard with respect to that area at the
same time as the first application. (3) Since the Board defines the scope
of proceedings, perhaps encompassing less than the entirety of an application, parts of applications must be severed for independent consideration.
In an effort to prevent the accumulation in the docket of odds and ends
left over in severing portions of applications for hearing, the Board recently had adopted a regulation providing that, where only a portion of
an application is included in a hearing, the remainder will be dismissed
without prejudice to its being refiled as an independent application.'
Finally, the Board has the means available to exercise some measure of
discriminating judgment in selecting among pending applications. The
Board is not the passive recipient of evidence generated by the parties.
Much of the relevant data is produced by the Board's own Office of Carrier
Accounts and Statistics. And this data is subjected to analysis by the Bureau
with a view to recommending actions by the Board in processing pending
applications.
The relation between the Board, the Chief Examiner, and the Bureau in
determining which cases to initiate is a complex one. The Chief Examiner
is aware of the availability of hearing examiners and of the other (nonroute) matters which are ripe for hearing and are, therefore, competing for
the attention of available examiners. The Bureau is in a position to indicate
the economic background of the various matters the Board may consider.
The Board passes on the recommendations of the Bureau and the Chief
Examiner. But the Board also influences the Bureau and the Chief Examiner by the formulation of general policies and the issuance of specific
instructions. And, as previously indicated, all three play a role in many
instances. While the function of the Chief Examiner is predominant in
noticing applications and that of the Bureau is paramount in orders to investigate or show cause, there are no ironclad compartments, e.g., a Bureau
recommendation may precipitate Board instructions leading the Chief Examiner to notice one group of applications rather than another. The close
interaction is most clearly illustrated on motions to expedite, which may
be the subject of conflicting recommendations by the Chief Examiner and
the Bureau respectively.
As between pending applications for new or additional service, a number of factors determine which will be considered. Some are heard pursuant
to a previously devised plan-as in the case of the series of area proceedings to review local service needs of various parts of the country. Some are
accorded priority by the nature of the request: city requests for first air
service generally prevail over requests involving additional air service. Some
result from problems created by prior Board decisions, as illustrated by
the recent investigation into the major monopoly markets created by the
merger of Capital and United.' Others receive attention as the Board or
the Bureau initiates inquiry into an area of apparently deficient service.
Finally, there is the pressure created by the demands of communities for
improved air service; these may take the form of independent applications
241
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or of motions to expedite pending proceedings. And here the theory seems
to be that the more noise a city can generate, the more likely the CAB will
schedule a hearing.
B. Preliminary Arrangements
Once it is decided to initiate a route proceeding, arrangements must be
made for a prehearing conference. Such matters are handled by the Chief
Examiner.143 He sets the precise time for the conference and designates the
place, usually Washington, D.C. His approval is required to hold the conference or the hearing itself at some other location, a decision influenced
by the availability of funds for out-of-town proceedings.
Another decision made at this stage is the selection of a hearing examiner. This is done by the Chief Examiner'" with an eye to the nature
and complexity of the case and the degree of speed required in its disposition. Not all examiners have the same capabilities; nor do they respond
alike to urgent situations. Mechanical rotation is rejected in favor of
making use of the examiner corps in the manner most conducive to the
effective handling of the pending caseload.
The number of cases being handled by an individual examiner varies
according to the nature of the cases. With respect to major route proceedings, an effort is made to permit an examiner to concentrate on a
single case until it is nearly completed. When the end is in sight, the examiner is assigned a new case so that the early prehearing stages of the
second case will be completed by the time the examiner is ready to devote
his primary attention to that case.
The notice of prehearing conference is sent by the Chief Examiner to
all parties and to "other persons who appear to have an interest in the proceeding. 14 A mailing list of carriers and cities is maintained by the Docket
Section. The notice is also published in the Federal Register.
C. The PrehearingConference And Efforts To Shape The Proceeding
One of the most difficult tasks of the Board is defining the scope of its
proceedings. In part this problem is related to the manner in which proceedings are initiated. If the first step is a bare noticing of applications by
the Chief Examiner, practically no definition is achieved at this first stage.
If, on the other hand, the proceeding is begun by a Board order, the scope
of the proceeding may be fairly well defined at the very outset. Thus the
choice of initiating technique has a bearing on the problem of shaping the
proceeding.
At or before the prehearing conference, airlines and communities are
permitted to file additional applications for inclusion in the proceeding. 4"
Motions to consolidate these applications with those pending and motions
to alter the scope of the proceeding may also be made at this time. 4 ' Petitions to intervene may be submitted at any time prior to the conference. 4 '
Answers may be filed to all such requests.'49 The prehearing conference is
concerned primarily with discussion of the proceeding's scope and with the
143 Rules of Practice 23 (a).
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14 Rules of Practice 23 (a).
"4Rules of Practice 12 (b).
14'Ibid.

148Rules of Practice 15 (c) (2) (ii).
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filing of last-minute applications and motions, including those made orally
at the conference."' Matters relating to the conduct of the proceedingsstipulations, requests for information, scheduling of submission of exhibits- are also taken up,"' but these matters are often overshadowed by
the problem of determining the scope of the proceeding. They are discussed
in the next section.
The hearing examiner who presides at the prehearing conference prepares two documents. One is a confidential report to the Board which (1)
describes the various applications, petitions, and motions made at the prehearing conference which affect the scope of the proceeding, (2) recommends the disposition to be made of each, with supporting reasons, and (3)
includes a draft of an order by the Board disposing of the matters pending
and defining the scope of the proceeding with presumptive finality. Where
significant legal issues are involved, concurrence of the General Counsel
(through the Special Counsel for Routes) is sought. In simpler cases the
examiner's memorandum may be a cryptic transmittal of a draft order.
All such matters are routed through the Chief Examiner. In case of disagreement with the examiner's recommendation by the Chief Examiner or
Special Counsel, the matter is sent back to the examiner to draft a new
order. As previously indicated, the tasks of all these parties are made easier
if the initiating action provides some guidance as to the nature and purpose of the proceeding and does not simply notice applications for hearing.
The second document is a public report of the prehearing conference...
which (1) announces in a general way the examiner's "assumptions" as to
the scope of the proceeding, and (2) states his conclusions on other mat-

ters considered at the conference. The examiner has no authority to reach
a decision on consolidation issues,"' so it is necessary to await the decision
of the Board. Indeed, the issue may require several decisions by the Board,
since the Board's first consolidation order often is subjected to petitions for
reconsideration by disappointed parties.154 The petitions are the subject of
memoranda by the hearing examiner and concurrence by the Chief Ex-

aminer and General Counsel (again through the Special Counsel for
Routes). While efforts are made to keep the proceeding moving during
the pendency of unresolved consolidation issues, progress is difficult while

the scope of the proceeding remains unsettled.
The considerations which govern definition of the proceeding's scope
will be considered in greater detail at a later point. For now it is sufficient
to observe that this is often an extremely complex and hotly contested
issue:
(1) Parties seemingly excluded from the proceeding fight vigorously

to have their applications included in order (a) to obtain an early decision
on their applications, and (b) to prevent their own applications from being prejudiced by grants of applications in the pending proceeding.
(2) Parties clearly included in the proceeding fight just as hard to ex-

clude additional applications (a) so as not to encumber the proceeding
...Rules of Practice 23 (a), 12 (b).
"'.Rules of Practice 23 (a).
"' Rules of Practice 23 (b).
...Rules of Practice 12, 22(c); Organization § 3.8; Brown, the Prehearing Conference 7 (unpublished paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, Administrative
Law Section, St. Louis, Missouri, 1961).
"" Rules of Practice 37.
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unduly and delay its disposition and (b) so as not to dilute the opportunities for success of the included parties.
(3) The examiner and the Board are subjected to conflicting pressures:
(a) On the one hand, there is the desire to confine the proceeding to the
particular air transportation problem which prompted the Board to set
the case down for hearing in the first instance, so that this problem may
be resolved as expeditiously as possible. (b) On the other hand, there are
borderline applications which may be prejudiced by a grant in this proceeding and which, in fairness, ought to be considered. The courts are
likely to find reversible error if the exclusion of applications from the proceeding is tantamount to denying them without an evidentiary hearing."'
Such reversals occur under the °"Ashbacker doctrine,' '.. which is designed
to assure comparative consideration of mutually exclusive applications.
The recurrence of Ashbacker problems result in detailed and time-consuming consideration of consolidation orders by both the responsible examiner and the Special Counsel for Routes.

D. Other Aspects Of The PrehearingConference
Apart from its role in helping to shape the proceeding, the prehearing
conference also is intended to serve more conventional purposes. The CAB's
procedural regulations state that such a conference "ordinarily" will be
held in economic proceedings (other than enforcement cases)
to define and simplify the issues and the scope of the proceedings, to secure
statements of the positions of the parties with respect thereto and amendments
to the pleadings in conformity therewith, to schedule the exchange of exhibits
before the date set for hearing, and to arrive at such agreements as will aid
in the conduct and disposition of the proceeding. For example, consideration
will be given to: (1) matters which the Board can consider without the
necessity of proof; (2) admission of fact and the genuineness of documents;
(3) admissibility of evidence; (4) limitation of the number of witnesses;
of oral testimony to exhibit form; (6) procedure at the hear(5) reducing
157
ing, etc.
The prehearing conference is informal in nature. Ordinarily no official
transcript is kept of the proceedings, although the examiner may have
his secretary attend to assist in taking notes. The conference is open to the
public but attendance is usually limited largely to the parties to the proceeding. The conference undoubtedly serves a useful purpose in familiarizing parties with the positions of their adversaries."' 8 Among its more
specific achievements are:
(1) Arrangement of a timetable for submission of exhibits, submission
of rebuttal exhibits, and commencement of hearing."9
(2) Stipulations of fact, particularly as to matters the Board may
officially notice."1 (This function probably is of less importance now that
the Board has taken steps to formally recognize the documentary facts it
will officially notice).
(3) Requests for the admission of information. In the absence of agreement, the examiner may direct any party to the proceeding "to prepare
...Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
'"Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
...Rules of Practice 23 (a).
...See Brown, the Prehearing Conference (1961).
...Rules of Practice 23 (b).
"" Rules of Practice 23 (a).
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and submit exhibits setting forth studies, forecasts, or estimates on mat-

ters relevant to the issue in the proceeding. 1. 1 This often is a sore spot in
the relations between Bureau Counsel and carrier representatives. The airlines complain about requests for extensive information which is expensive
and difficult to compile; the Bureau objects to efforts to suppress relevant
information. Similar disputes may arise among the carriers themselves.
Where carriers are unwilling to voluntarily comply with requests, the
hearing examiner must pass on the countervailing arguments of burden
and relevancy. Examiners are said to vary greatly in their disposition to
compel compliance with Bureau requests or requests by other parties."'
The tension is in part the result of a feeling by some that the theory of the
adversary process should be more fully applicable and that individual carriers ought to prove their own cases without reliance on the submissions of
others. There is also some uncertainty as to the sanction to be applied to a
party refusing to produce material in response to an examiner's directive.
Probably most information sought is voluntarily produced, if only to
avoid any inference that the withheld information is adverse to the party
subject to the request. Compliance with such requests is achieved by embodying the material sought in the responding party's exhibits.
(4) Encouragement of parties with like interest to consolidate their
representation and the presentation of evidence. 63'
In order to facilitate disposition of these and other matters, parties may
be requested to submit in advance of the conference all motions, statements of suggested issues, proposed stipulations, and requests for evidence.
Such a request may be embodied in the original notice of the prehearing
conference.
Many of the other matters considered at the prehearing conference are
handled in standardized fashion under a set of ground rules prepared by
the Bureau of Hearing Examiners and entitled "Standards of Procedure in
Economic Proceedings., 14 The "Standards" are applicable to all economic
proceedings (except enforcement matters) unless exceptions are sought
and departures approved at the prehearing conference. They provide
among other things:
(1) That all evidence, including the testimony of witnesses, shall be
prepared in written exhibit form and shall be served at designated dates
in advance of the hearing. Witnesses must be made available for crossexamination, but they are not permitted to read prepared testimony into
the record. 6 '
(2) That the evidentiary record shall be confined to evidence and shall
exclude argument.' Formerly an applicant used to begin its case with a
"policy witness," whose principal function was to explain the proposals
and theories of the applicant. Now parties (except Bureau Counsel) are
directed to exchange statements of position, explaining their theories, prior
11 Rules of Practice 23 (a).

"2See

reopened Pacific-Northwest Local Service case, E-14564

(Oct. 19, 1959),

where the

Board reversed an Examiner's ruling that certain material need not be produced.
63 Standards of Procedure in Economic Proceedings, § 4 (hereafter "Standards"),

2 Avi. L.

Rep., 5 23,032 (1961).
1 For discussions of the Standards, see Brown, the Prehearing Conference (1961); Remarks of
Paul W. Pfeiffer at the Federal Bar Convention, Washington, D.C., Sept. 13, 1961.
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to the hearing. These are not subject to cross-examination. More detailed
trial briefs may also be required by the examiner.
(3) That the authenticity of all documents submitted as proposed exhibits in advance of the hearing shall be deemed admitted unless either (a)
written objection is filed prior to the hearing, or " (b) good cause is shown
for failure to have filed such written objection. '
(4) That the order of presenting cases will be in alphabetical order in
each of the following categories:
(a) City and state interests and other government departments.
(b) Applicants.
(c) Other private parties.
(d) Bureau Counsel.
Rebuttal evidence normally must be presented at the same time as the
party's direct case.1"' Exhibits are to be offered in evidence at the close of
the sponsoring witness's
direct testimony for ruling by the examiner prior
1
to cross-examination. 70
(5) That, except for Bureau Counsel, cross-examination shall be limited
to witnesses whose testimony is adverse to the party desiring to crossexamine, thereby precluding "friendly cross-examination." Second rounds
of cross-examination are not permitted, and cross-examination
of any par71
ticular witness is limited to one attorney for each party. 1
The prehearing conference is followed by a report of the examiner, to
which reference already has been made. The report embodies an account of
the results of the conference.' Objections may be filed, and the examiner
may revise his report in the light of such objections. The revised report
may be subjected to exceptions based upon timely filed objections not met
in the revised report. The report, although subject to subsequent reconsideration and modification for good cause, controls the course of the proceedings. 75

E. Parties To Formal Proceedings
One consequence of shaping the proceeding is to indicate with some
definiteness the appropriate parties. Carriers and cities whose applications
have been included are obviously parties. So are those whose petitions to
intervene have been granted. Finally, there is Bureau Counsel.
Examiners recently have been delegated authority to rule on petitions to
intervene."' Formerly these were presented to the Board in the same manner as consolidation issues. Petitions may be filed subsequent to the prehearing conference only on a showing of good cause."

Persons who are not permitted to intervene as parties nonetheless may
participate at the hearing before the examiner-presenting relevant evidence, submitting a written statement on the issues involved, and with
the permission of the examiner, cross-examining other witnesses.' 6 This
e Standards
166 Standards
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Rules of Practice 23 (b).
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technique is often used by civic participants. On the whole, however, participants are identified in the course of shaping the proceeding.
Divided functionally the parties include: (1) carrier applicants seeking
new or expanded authority; (2) civic interests, either applicants or interveners, generally seeking new or improved air service; (3) incumbent air
carriers, interveners, concerned with preventing authorizations competitive with theirs; and (4) Bureau Counsel. An air carrier may be cast in
dual roles, seeking additional authority for itself while also attempting to
protect its existing routes from competitive grants to others.
Bureau Counsel ordinarily does not attempt to align itself with any of
the other parties. During the proceeding he tries to assure a complete
record, including the introduction of Bureau exhibits. But at or near the
conclusion of the proceeding Bureau Counsel will take a position as to
the result believed to be required by the public interest. Recently Bureau
Counsel has been tending to take a position earlier in the proceeding.
The effort of the prehearing conference to encourage common representation has been paralleled by a recent policy statement governing civic
participants.'77 The statement urges public and civic bodies representing
the same geographic area or community to consolidate their presentation of
evidence, briefs, and oral argument to the examiner and the Board, and
to "keep to a minimum the number of witnesses used to present the factual evidence in support of the community's position."
F. Conduct Of Formal Proceedings
As previously noted, the prehearing conference sets dates for the exchange of exhibits, including rebuttal exhibits, and for the hearing itself.
The hearing date, time, and place also are embodied in a formal notice sent
to all parties and published in the Federal Register.7 8 The exhibits embody
the great bulk of direct evidence on the part of the various participants
and oral testimony is usually concerned with explaining, correcting, or
supplementing the exhibits on direct examination, and with defending the
methodology of the exhibits on cross-examination. The extent of crossexamination appears to vary considerably and is often prolonged by successive turns of a large number of adverse parties.
Although there may be some testimony concerning personal experiences
of travelers in attempting to use existing transportation media, most of
the evidence is statistical in nature and is presented by expert witnesses.
Cities attempt to demonstrate the size and importance of their various activities, their need for new or improved air service, their capacity to support such air service, and the closeness of their ties with the points to
which the requested air service is sought. Applicant carriers seek to show
their ability to render the service required, the attractiveness of their
respective proposals, and the economic feasibility (or modest subsidy demands) of their proposals-based on projected costs and revenues. Both
the cities and the carrier applicants seek to demonstrate, through past
traffic volumes, the significant traffic potential of the route in question;
and if the question is adding a new carrier to those already in a market, the
applicants will focus on any service deficiencies and the alleged failure of
the incumbent to develop fully the traffic potential of the route. The incumbent, of course, attempts to show just the opposite: that the traffic
17749 C.F.R. § 399.39.
178
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potential of the route is low and that it has done its utmost to keep abreast
of any developments in the traffic.
While the applicants will be united in their effort to show the need for
new service, they will divide sharply on who should render it. Each will
attempt to demonstrate why its proposals are superior to those of any of
the other applicants. Similarly, cities will divide sharply on the nature of
the final authorization: claims for through service will conflict with demands for inclusion by intermediate points; diverse routes proposed by
different carriers will each pick up adherents among the cities to be benefited thereby.
The starting point may be a common body of statistics, emanating in
large measure from the Board's Office of Carrier Accounts and Statistics
and from individual carrier records. But as supplemented and adjusted by
the various parties for differing estimates as to future contingencies, the
opinions grow further and further apart and the examiner is confronted
by widely conflicting conclusions.
The common statistical base is recognized in a recent regulation setting
forth forty-two categories of documents as to the contents of which official
notice may be taken. "' The tendencies to proliferation of estimates and
supplementary statistical data have resulted in notices of proposed rulemaking, policy statements, and rule amendments which would exclude or
severely limit (1) evidence concerning proposed schedules of applicants
except in special cases,"' (2) evidence of civic participants as to electricity, gas and water meters, telephones, schools, freight car loadings, building permits, sewer connections, and bank deposits,' and (3) evidence of
applicants as to service to points or segments not covered in their applications."9 ' An even more ambitious undertaking is involved in a recent rulemaking notice which proposes to standardize methods of estimating costs
of proposed changes in local service carrier operations."'
The CAB's regulations grant to hearing examiners the powers normally
associated with officers presiding over formal proceedings.' " In addition
the rules prohibit interlocutory appeals from the decisions of an examiner
unless the examiner finds "that the allowance of such an appeal is necessary to prevent substantial detriment to the public interest or undue
prejudice to any party." s3
G. Within The Bureau
Paralleling the development of a route case in formal proceedings are
activities within the Bureau relating to that same case. As cases are noticed
for prehearing conference, a decision must be made as to whether Bureau
Counsel will participate. The Director of the Bureau has the authority to
limit or preclude Bureau participation, *s but Bureau Counsel traditionally
participates in all important route cases.
Where participation is decided upon, there are assigned to the case an
attorney from the Legal Staff and an analyst from the appropriate section.
.'.Rules of Practice 24 (m).
...
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, PDR-10, 26 Fed. Reg. 9913 (1961).
'a' Policy Statement, 49 C.F.R. § 399.39.

...
Rules of Practice 930(a).
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, PDR-17, 26 Fed. Reg. 12623
'..Rules of Practice 22 (c) ; Organization § 3.8.
...Rules of Practice 18(f).
'" Organization § 4.3A, 4.12.
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They work together in preparing requests for information, Bureau exhibits, and statements of Bureau position. They also examine the exhibits
of other parties, formulate questions of cross-examination, and generally
decide upon their tactics in the proceeding.
As previously indicated, the Bureau's role is partially a neutral one: to
assure a complete record adequate for decision by the Board. The effectuation of this function probably can be handled in large measure by the
lawyer and analyst directly assigned to the case: clarifying the meaning of
exhibits submitted by other parties; preparing and submitting standard
Bureau exhibits. On the other hand, the formulation of a Bureau position
may involve the entire Bureau hierarchy: Director, Deputy Director, Division Chief, Section Chief, etc. The development of a Bureau position
does not follow any fixed pattern. Sometimes it is based on a general attitude developed some time in the past. In other instances it is decided upon
to meet the problems of the particular case. While there is a tendency to
delay in formulating a position until most or all of the evidence is in,
tentative positions often must be adopted earlier in the case in order to facilitate the preparation of Bureau exhibits.
Bureau attorneys report that the adversary process is well reflected in
their relations with carrier attorneys. That is, no matter what position they
adopt, they can generally count on the antagonism of the totality of carrier counsel.
H. The Decisional Process
Following the close of the evidentiary hearing, the parties, including
Bureau Counsel, submit briefs to the examiner including proposed findings."7 While the rules require "exact references to the record and authorities relied upon," the references sometimes are very general and provide little assistance to the examiner in working with the record. The examiner also may permit oral argument at the conclusion of the hearing,
subject to such time limits as he imposes. " ' The argument is trancribed and
bound with the transcript of testimony so as to be available to the Board
for consideration in deciding the case."' In practice, oral argument before
the examiner is extremely rare.
The examiner then prepares his initial decision."' Except for a secretary, he is without immediate direct assistance. There is some uncertainty
as to the extent to which examiners call upon other staff members for assistance. But apparently there is a tendency, whenever such assistance is
sought, to look to the Office of Carrier Accounts and Statistics rather than
to the Bureau of Economic Regulation, which is viewed as one of the
adversaries in the proceeding. Among the kinds of assistance requested are
(1) explanations of technical terms of exhibits, (2) statistical analyses required by an examiner's inclination to follow a path not suggested by any
of the parties, and (3) construction of tables and the like for inclusion
in the initial decision. But more significant than any of these matters is the
pronounced tendency of examiners to refrain from having any informal
contact with the Bureau about the case.
When the initial decision is served, the parties have ten days within
".. Rules

of Practice 26.
...Rules of Practice 25(b).
180 Ibid.
188 Rules of Practice 27.
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which to file exceptions. ' It is contemplated that the exceptions will be
limited to the ultimate conclusions in the initial decision with which the
party disagrees, such as "selection of one carrier rather than another to
serve any point or points; points included in or excluded from a new
route; imposition or failure to impose a given restriction." 2 Specific exceptions to underlying findings or statements are forbidden, but the exceptions must specify any matters of law, fact, or policy to be set forth
for the first time on brief to the Board.9 If no exceptions are filed within
the ten day period9 4 and if the Board in the next twenty days takes no
action to review the decision, the initial decision becomes the order of the
Board.'
With the filing of the initial decision, the case is assigned to an attorney
in the Opinion Writing Division of the Office of General Counsel. After
exceptions are filed, the parties, including Bureau Counsel, file briefs to
the Board,' 8 limited to fifty pages in length in the absence of special
leave. 9 ' These are reviewed by the opinion writing attorney as they come in.
Arrangements for oral argument are made through the Chief Examiner. 8' Requests are granted as a matter of course, and it is customary
to have oral argument before the Board in every significant route case.
Allocations are made generally on the basis of thirty minutes each to
carrier applicants, fifteen minutes each to carrier interveners, and five
minutes each to civic interveners. The Chief Examiner has been able, in
most cases, to make satisfactory arrangements; serious complaints can be
passed on to the Board.
As the date for oral argument approaches, the opinion writing attorney
prepares a "memorandum of issues," briefly summarizing the main points
in dispute and the decision of the examiner and contentions of the parties
with respect to these points (with page references to the initial decision
and the briefs). The documents, transmitted by the head of the Opinion
Writing Division, is quite cryptic containing only (1) an introduction
descriptive of the general posture of the case, and (2) a summary of arguments on each of the issues listed, usually limited to a sentence or two per
party. No conclusions are stated, and no analysis is set forth (other than
that implicit in the arrangement of issues). Since there appears to be considerable effort directed at keeping the total length of the memorandum
down, the document may be more lucid when the case is not overly complex. Probably the memorandum serves as a useful guide to the oral argument and as an index and cross-reference sheet for the initial decision and
briefs, but it is doubtful that it could serve, or is intended to serve, any
broader purpose.
At this time or somewhat later the opinion writing attorney prepares
a second memorandum isolating any significant legal problems. This is
transmitted by the head of the Opinion Writing Division to the Special
" Rules of Practice 30.
'..

Rules of Practice 30 (b).

193Ibid.

"' Rules of Practice 30.
"'Rules of Practice 27(c).

Effective Feb. 1, 1962, the Board established new procedures for
review of examiner decisions, 27 Fed. Reg. 853 (1962). These are discussed in a subsequent section
dealing with delegation of decisional authority to hearing examniers.

' Rules of Practice 31 (a).
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DOMESTIC LICENSING: THE CAB

Counsel for Routes so that major legal problems can be resolved prior to
the actual drafting of the Board's opinion.
At the oral argument, which is usually limited to a single day or less
but may last for several days in a major case, the parties often use exhibits
or written materials to supplement their oral presentations. 99' The responsible opinion writing attorney attends the sessions. Formerly arguments of the parties were preceded by speeches of political figures, making
arguments which usually had no relation to the record. This practice recently has been abolished by amendment of the Board's Rules of Practice."°
Following oral argument and preceding Board decision, the opinion
writing attorney prepares a "request for instructions," an extremely brief
document (one or two pages) which merely lists the issues the Board
must decide in order to fully dispose of the case. The request is transmitted
to the Board by the head of the Opinion Writing Division.
The Board then convenes for the purpose of deciding the case. The examiner, having filed his initial decision, and the Bureau, having made its
arguments in the public arena, generally are not consulted further. Even
the opinion writer is removed from the deliberative process by the Board's
retirement to executive session for the purpose of discussion and decision.
The General Counsel's presence may be requested to discuss a particular
matter, or the Board may honor a request from the General Counsel to
present his views, but generally the decisional process is carried on outside the presence of the staff.
The Board's tentative decision, made after conference and vote of the
members (with personal assistants sometimes acting for members), is embodied in a press release for general disclosure to the public. The Board had
found its tentative decisions invariably were "leaked" to the industry
shortly after they had been made, so the press release practice was established to preclude any individual outsider from gaining an unfair advantage. Press releases have been used with decreasing frequency in recent months.
Under a recent revision of Board practice, Board Members are assigned
individual responsibility for the preparation of opinions. Assignments are
made by the Chairman of the Board,"°' who takes into account the individual Member's interest in the case and the time he has available in light
of his other commitments. However, the initial draft generally is prepared
by the assigned opinion writing attorney with a minimum of contact with
the responsible Board Member. While the practices of individual Members
vary, and their personal contributions to some oponions may be greater
than to others, the usual sequence seems to be this:
(1) The Board Member returns from the conference and informs his
personal assistant of the instructions of the Board in the case for which he
is responsible, and any ideas of his own as to the direction the opinion
should take.
(2) The personal assistant conveys the instructions to the head of the
Opinion Writing Division.
(3) The head of the Opinion Writing Division in turn conveys the instructions to the assigned opinion writing attorney.
199 See Rules of Practice 32 (b).

" See amendment to Rules of Practice 14, 26 Fed. Reg. 4282 (1961).
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(4) The opinion writing attorney, working with instructions, initial
decision, exceptions, briefs, and the evidentiary record, drafts an opinion.
(5) The opinion is reviewed by the head of the Opinion Writing Division
or one of his senior aides, and revisions are made as required.
(6) The new certificate, if one is required by the grant of operating authority, is drafted by a senior attorney in the Opinion Writing Division
who specializes in such matters.
(7) The total product is transmitted to the General Counsel for review
by him or someone in his immediate office. Revisions are held to a minimum
by prior consultations with the Special Counsel for Routes.
(8) The draft is submitted to the responsible Board Member, who reviews it and makes such revisions as he considers advisable, either personally
or through his personal assistant.
(9) The responsible Board Member circulates the draft to other Members of the Board until a majority is obtained.
(10) Consultations occur during the course of the opinion writing process as problems arise. While a Board Member may invite an opinion writing attorney to come in to discuss revisions in the opinion, more often
contact will be made with the head of the Opinion Writing Division, possibly through the Board Member's personal assistant. There seems to be a
strong tendency to "follow channels," placing several persons between the
Board Member and the opinion writing attorney on communications in
either direction.
Board Members generally accept the work of the Opinion Writing Division in large measure. Revisions, though sometimes significant, are often
rather minor "personal touches." On the other hand, concurring and dissenting opinions usually are prepared in their entirety in the offices of individual Members.
The opinion writer's familiarity with the record is likely to be gained
rather late in the process. Heavy reliance is placed upon the parties' briefs
and exceptions for record references since the initial decision contains
none. Under prior practice where opinion writers were present during
the Board's discussion and decision of the case and might be called upon to
answer queries from the Board (usually routed through their superiors),
their tendency was to acquire an earlier familiarity about crucial data, such
as traffic flows over congested segments. There seems little point to such a
familiarization by opinoin writers under present procedures.
The inclination of opinion writers to consult Bureau personnel has declined in recent months. As with hearing examiners, any inquiry is likely
to be directed to the Office of Carrier Accounts and Statistics.
When the Board's opinion issues, the parties have twenty days within
0
which to petition for reconsideration, rehearing, or reargument."'
These
are generally reiterations of the main points on which the parties previously relied. Another Board order is required to dispose of the petitions.
Successive petitions on the same grounds will not be entertained. 2 ' The
petitions are processed in much the same way as the drafting of opinions
and by the same opinion writer except that here the Opinion Writing
Division will usually recommend the disposition thought appropriate. The
recommendation may be circulated in written form or conveyed orally at
a Board meeting.
0 Rules of Practice 37(a).
...Rules of Practice 37(c).
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VII. OPERATING AUTHORITY NOT DEPENDENT UPON
FORMAL PROCEEDINGS

Although the certification process is the principal means by which
operating authority is granted, the Board has by regulation established
other methods by which such authority may be obtained or exercised.
A. Nonstop Authorizations
A certificated carrier may inaugurate scheduled nonstop service between
any two points not consecutively named in its certificate, simply by filing
a new schedule, as long as the certificate (1) authorizes service between
such points, i.e., they are on the same segment of the same route, and
(2) does not prohibit nonstop service between them (as is the case with
local service carriers).04
B. Airport Authorizations
A certificated carrier, desiring to regularly serve a point to which service by it is authorized, through an airport not then regularly used by such
carrier, must file a notice with the Board at least thirty days prior to such
intended use. "' Notice is also given to other interested persons including
all scheduled air carriers regularly serving the point in question, and they
are given fifteen days to file memoranda in support of, or in opposition to,
the airport notice. 0" In the absence of CAB disapproval, service through the
new airport may be commenced on the day specified." 7 If, on the other
hand, the Board indicates that the airport use intended may adversely affect
the public interest, the carrier must then file an application, more detailed
than the original notice and with supporting economic data, seeking affirmative Board authorization. " ' Service on the same interested persons is
required, and opportunity is afforded to file supporting or objecting
9
memoranda; but no provision is made for a hearing."' The Chief of the
Routes and Agreements Division has been delegated authority to approve
or disapprove airport notices. 1'
C. Service Pattern Changes
Local service carriers are required to serve all points on their routes
until a designated minimum number of flights per day have been provided.
If such a carrier desires to omit service to one or more points without
complying with the restrictions in its certificate, it must file an application for a change in service pattern, setting forth the facts relied on with
supporting economic data, to establish that the proposed service pattern
is in the public interest and consistent with the carrier's performance of a
local air transportation service. 11 Service on interested parties is required
and an opportunity to answer is afforded. ' The Chief of the Routes and
Agreements Division has been delegated authority (1) to approve or disapprove applications seeking authority to effect temporary or seasonal
204 14 C.F.R. § 202.2; Organization § 4.11, 4.3C(2); Delegation § 3L5.13 (b).

20 14 C.F.R. § 202.3 (a).
206 14 C.F.R. S 202.3 (a), 202.3 (c).
207 14 C.F.R. 5 202.3 (a).
20014 C.F.R. 5 202.3 (b).
14 C.F.R. 5 202.3 (b), 202.3 (c).
'o Organization § 4.11, 4.3C(1); Delegation S 385.13 (a).
2" 14 C.F.R. S 202.4(b).
212 14 C.F.R. § 202.4(b), 202.4(c).
209

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
changes in service patterns; and (2) to revoke, modify, or renew prior
approval of temporary or seasonal changes in service patterns. 1'
D. Charters And Special Services
A certificated carrier may engage in charter and special service flights
14
to points not designated on its routes if a number of conditions are met.'
(1) Such flights during any calendar quarter may not in the aggregate,
on a revenue plane-mile basis, exceed 2 /2 per cent of the revenue planemiles flown by the carrier in scheduled air transportation during the preceding twelve-month period."' (2) Such flights must conform to prescribed
limitations designed to assure irregularity of operation."' (3) Tariffs covering such flights must be on file with the Board and effective."7 (4)
Charter flights must conform to the regulation's definition of a charter
designed to assure sale of the entire capacity of the plane to the charterer."'
Special service flights (all flights except those pursuant to certificate,
exemption or charter)21 must be preceded by a notice to the Board and to
carriers certificated to serve the points in question. The Board may preclude
the special service flight by notifying the carrier that the flight does not
appear to be consistent with the public interest."'

E. Air Taxi Operations
Air carriers not holding any certificate or operating authority from the
Board may utilize small aircraft exclusively (less than 12,500 pounds takeoff weight) in rendering irregular service between points not certificated
for service by helicopters or small aircraft."'

F. Helicopter Flight Patterns
An operator of certificated helicopter services may change its flight pattern within its certificated area in accordance with a special procedure."'
Notice must be given to the Board and designated persons twenty days
before the proposed change."' Opportunity to answer is afforded." The
change may be put into effect on the effective dates unless and until the
Board disapproves of the flight pattern." The Chief of the Routes and
Agreements Division has been delegated authority to approve or disapprove of proposed amendments of helicopter flight patterns."'

G. Individual Exemptions
Perhaps the most significant source of uncertificated authority is individual exemptions. 2' These may involve authority to overfly junction
"' Delegation 5 385.13(k).
214 14 C.F.R. § 207.

21 14 C.F.R. § 207.5.
21 14 C.F.R. 5 207.3, 207.7.
"17 14 C.F.R. § 207.4.
21 14 C.F.R. § 207.1(a).
219 14 C.F.R. § 207.1 (c).
220 14 C.F.R. § 207.9; MATS charters are not considered here because: (1) primarily such
charters cover international operations, and (2) processing of such charter authorizations is concerned primarily with rates, being handled by the Rates Division of the Bureau of Economic
Regulations.
221 14 C.F.R. § 298.21(b).
22" 14 C.F.R. § 376, as amended, 27 Fed. Reg. 3376 (1962).
22 14 C.F.R.
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points, i.e., to fly directly between points on different route segments, or
to render service to a point or series of points not covered by the certificate.
Usually the exemption is ganted for a limited period, such as a year or
two."' Application is made to the Board with notice to designated persons, including carriers serving any of the points involved or applicants
seeking authority to serve any such points."' Answers may be served
within ten days of the application.2 Both application and answers should
be accompanied by statements of economic data the parties desire the
Board to officially notice, and by affidavits establishing any other facts
relied upon.' A reply is permitted within seven days of the answer.'
A
hearing may be requested by applicant or opposing parties, 2 ' but normally
no formal hearing is held on the disposition of an application for exemption. Opportunity for notice and answer may be curtailed when required
by emergency situations. 4
Exemption applications are processed in the appropriate sections of the
Routes and Agreements Division of the Bureau of Economic Regulation.
Recommendations made by the analyst working on the case go through
the Section Head, Division Chief, and Bureau Director to the Board. Exemptions are most likely to be granted if they are unopposed. The chances
of favorable action diminish considerably if substantial opposition develops.
The Director of the Bureau of Economic Regulation has been delegated
authority to approve or deny (1) applications of certificated route air
carriers for exemptions to serve a point certificated on one segment of its
route in place of a point certificated on another segment of its route whenever no substantial competition to other lines will result, and (2) applications by such carriers to perform single flights outside the authority contained in the certificate.
H. Board Review Of Staff Action
Acting under Reorganization Plan No. 3,29 the Board recently has codified its delegations in informal proceedings and prescribed the methods by
which they are to be exercised. Among other things, the new Board regulation provides that persons adversely affected by staff action2 under delegated authority may petition for Board review, urging "that (1) a finding
of material fact is clearly erroneous; (2) a legal conclusion is contrary to
law, Board rules, or precedent; (3) a substantial and important question
of policy is involved; (4) a prejudicial procedural error has occurred; or
(5) the staff action is substantially deficient on its face."2' Board review
will be granted on petition, or on its own motion, if two or more Board
Members so desire. 9 Otherwise the Board in its discretion may deny review.2
229 The duration of exemptions is the subject of a pending rule making proceeding. See Notice
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VIII.

AN EXAMPLE OF

CAB

LICENSING: THE ST. Louis-

SOUTHEAST SERVICE CASE

The functioning of CAB licensing can perhaps be understood only in
the context of a concrete example. Illustrative of the problems of major
route cases is the St. Louis-Southeast Service case, 241 one of several such
proceedings finally resolved by the Board in fiscal 1961.
A. Initiation Of The Proceeding
The St. Louis-Southeast case began as a motion in another proceeding,
the pending Great Lakes-Southeast Service case,2 * concerned with air
transportation needs in an area bounded by Chicago, Detroit, and Buffalo
on the north; Indianapolis, Louisville, and Atlanta on the west; Washington and Baltimore on the east; and Tampa and Miami on the south. On
February 10, 1956, following the airing of complaints before a Senate
Subcommittee, the City of St. Louis and related civic interests filed (1)
an application for authorization of additional nonstop air service between
St. Louis, on the one hand, and Atlanta, Tampa, and Miami, on the other,
and (2) a motion to consolidate this request with applications then pending in the Great Lakes-Southeast case. By order dated March 2, the Board
denied the motion to consolidate but directed that an independent proceeding be instituted to consider the need for new air service "between St.
Louis on the one hand and Florida and other southeastern points on the
other hand."2 On March 7, the CAB's Chief Examiner issued a notice of
prehearing conference to implement the Board's direction. The St. Louis
application was noticed, as were several subsequently filed carrier applications concerned with air service in the same area. Thus was born the St.
Louis-Southeast Service case.
B. PrehearingConference And Consolidation Issues
The prehearing conference was held as scheduled on March 22, 1956.
Numerous applications were sought to be consolidated, other motions were
made, and petitions to intervene and other matters were placed before the
examiner for consideration. Answering memoranda were filed. The examiner's conclusions were embodied in a published report of the prehearing
conference dated April 25 and in an internal memorandum dated April
26. The Chief Examiner transmitted the internal memorandum, with his
summary concurrence, to the Board on May 16, and the Board issued its
consolidation order on May 18, 1956.2"
The applications involved"2 and their disposition may be briefly summarized:
The St. Louis application, of course, was included in the proceeding.
Braniff sought to extend its route 48-which ran from Minneapolis-St.
Paul to St. Louis-beyond St. Louis to Nashville, Chattanooga, Atlanta,
Tampa, and Miami. The application was included as clearly within the
scope of the proceeding as initially defined.
Delta sought to extend its route 54-which ran from Miami to Chicago
24127 C.A.B. 342 (1958), on reconsideration, E-13248 (Dec. 8, 1958), affirmed in part, reversed
in part and remanded, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 969 (1960), on r'emand, E-15599 (July 29, 1960).
2
2" Concluded, E-13835 (May 7, 1959).
"E-10063 (March 2, 1956).
2
"E-10304 (May 18, 1956).
"41Maps showing the routes of the carrier applicants are inserted following p. 152.
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through alternate segments touching Cincinnati, Knoxville, and Atlantafrom Atlanta to Birmingham and beyond Birmingham to St. Louis and
Kansas City via two branches: one including Chattanooga, Nashville, and
Evansville; and the other by way of Memphis. Delta also sought to add
Tampa to the route. The application was regarded as clearly included except for the segment from St. Louis to Kansas City. The examiner recommended the exclusion of the latter because consideration of Kansas City
might require that Tulsa, Shreveport, and New Orleans be brought in.
Delta, it should be noted, had other routes touching points in the area, including one running from Chicago through St. Louis and Memphis to
New Orleans.
National sought to extend its route 31-which ran from New York and
northeast points to Jacksonville, Tampa, and Miami-from Jacksonville to
Atlanta and beyond Atlanta to St. Louis via two branches; one through
Chattanooga, Nashville, and Evansville and the other through Birmingham
and Memphis. National also sought to extend its route 39-which ran
from Miami to New Orleans-beyond New Orleans to St. Louis via alternate routes. The route 31 extension was regarded as within the scope of
the proceeding, but the route 39 extension was regarded as expanding the
scope of the proceedings, requiring, inter alia, inclusion of another New
Orleans-St. Louis application.
TWA proposed extension of its route 2-which ran from the West
Coast across the southern half of the United States to St. Louis (via
Kansas City)-beyond St. Louis to Nashville, Atlanta, Tampa, and Miami.
The proposal was clearly within the scope of the proceeding.
North American (later changed to Trans American), a combination of
non-scheduled airlines having no certificated mileage, sought a new route
from St. Louis to Nashville and (1) beyond Nashville to Birmingham,
Tallahassee, Tampa, and Miami and (2) beyond Nashville to Chattanooga
and Atlanta and (3) beyond Atlanta to Jacksonville and Miami and (4)
beyond Atlanta to Tampa and Miami. This proposal was included, but
the examiner recommended exclusion of other, very extensive proposals
of North American, because they were filed too late and because they expanded unduly the scope of the proceeding.
Southern, a local service carrier, sought to include an application for
authority between Memphis and Atlanta via intermediate points, because
this paralleled segments of the Delta and National proposals. The examiner
recommended exclusion because of the policy of considering local service and trunkline proposals separately; also implicity rejected was a Southeri motion to expressly exclude trunkline carriers from rendering a local
service in this market.
The City of Nashville sought improved air service by inclusion on a
St. Louis-Southeast route, a Chicago-Southeast route, and a DetroitCincinnati-Southeast route. The Nashville application was included in so
far as it related to St. Louis-Southeast service but was otherwise excluded
because of the obvious expansion in the proceedings that would follow
from the other aspects of the application.
Similarly, Kansas City and Minneapolis-St. Paul sought to expand the
scope of the proceeding to consider their needs. And Continental asked to
have a Kansas City-St. Louis proposal of its own consolidated if Kansas
City were included. All were rejected.
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The incumbent on St. Louis-Southeast service was Eastern with its route
10 running from Miami and Tampa along parallel segments to Nashville,
touching Atlanta, Birmingham, Chattanooga, and most other area points
here involved. At Nashville the route broke into two forks, one terminating
in St. Louis and the other in Chicago. Eastern moved that the entire proceeding be deferred and take its proper place on the docket, complaining
that many Eastern applications filed long before the St. Louis application
were still languishing on the Board's docket, some for more than ten years.
In the alternative, Eastern sought to consolidate applications for:
(1) Extensions from Chicago to Twin Cities, from St. Louis to Twin
Cities, and from St. Louis to Kansas City. Eastern contended that Braniff's
application, if granted, would permit Braniff to connect the Twin Cities
and Kansas City, on its existing route, with the Southeast by means of an
extension to the south and east. This same connection was sought by Eastern, except that the extension would be from Eastern's certificated points
in the Southeast and Chicago to the north and west. Similar extensions
were sought by National and Delta.
(2) Extensions from St. Louis to Chicago and from Tampa to Knoxville and Cincinnati. Eastern contended that Delta's application, if granted,
would permit service between Chicago and the Southeast via St. Louis and
between Tampa and Knoxville-Cincinnati, because Chicago, Knoxville, and
Cincinnati were already included on Delta's routes.
(3) Service between St. Louis and the West Coast. TWA, it was argued,
would gain a route from the West Coast to the Southeast if its application
were granted. The same route was sought by Eastern's extension west of
St. Louis. Similar extensions were sought by National and Delta.
The examiner assumed that Eastern's motion to defer was foreclosed by
the Board's discretionary judgment to institute proceedings. Rejection was
recommended as to all of Eastern's applications because of their tendency
to expand the proceeding.
The final issue concerning scope of the proceedings was the nature of
restrictions to be imposed on any authority granted so as to limit the new
award to one basically for St. Louis-Southeast service. The examiner
recommended a mandatory stop at St. Louis for all flights from the Southeast terminating north or west of St. Louis. More extreme limitationssuch as mandatory change of plane at St. Louis-were rejected without
prejudice to their renewal later in the proceeding.
The examiner's recommendations, included in his internal report to the
Board, were in all cases followed. The Board issued as its consolidation
order the draft prepared by the examiner. In his published prehearing conference report, on the other hand, the examiner merely noted which applications seemed to be within the scope of the proceeding as initially indicted by the Board and stated that other applications would be reported
to the Board.
The examiner was also confronted with motions to intervene by American, Capital, Northwest, Southern, and three civic groups. Denial of all
such petitions was recommended. No definitive action was taken on Bureau
Counsel's request for information or the determination of dates for submission of exhibits and commencement of the hearing. In late April and
early May exceptions to the prehearing conference report were filed by
Capital, Northwest, Kansas City, American, Eastern, TWA, and Delta.
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On June 14 the examiner passed on the exceptions of the parties in a
supplementary prehearing conference report, finding them foreclosed by
the Board's consolidation order or subject to further Board consideration.
This report also established procedural dates which, because of subsequent
revisions, were not observed.
Petitions for reconsideration of the consolidation order were filed in
June by Eastern and North America, and answers were filed by American,
Braniff, Delta, TWA, and St. Louis. The North American petition did not
raise any new points, but the Eastern petition did. It pointed out that
consolidation of Delta's application for a St. Louis-Memphis-Southeast
segment would permit Delta, already authorized between St. Louis and
Kansas City, to connect Kansas City to Southeast via Memphis. Eastern
therefore sought: (1) a Memphis-Kansas City segment; (2) a ChattanoogaBirmingham authorization; and (3) a St. Louis-Memphis segment. Eastern was already authorized to serve these last four cities; but the cities
were so located on different routes that Eastern could not provide direct
service between the two pairs indicated.
On September 17 and 28, the Board granted the petitions to intervene
of American, Capital, Northwest, Piedmont, Southern, and seventeen community representatives."' Intervention by additional community representatives was subsequently allowed, resulting in some ten carrier parties
and over twenty civic representatives.
On October 2, the Board passed on the petitions to reconsider its consolidation order.247 The North American petition was denied. Also rejected was the Kansas City-Memphis proposal of Eastern, the Board relying
on the fact that Delta would be obligated to stop at Memphis on flights
between Kansas City and the Southeast. The second and third proposals of
Eastern were included because (1) they were within the area that coincided with proposed segments of other applicants, and (2) either they were
made orally at the prehearing conference and overlooked by the examiner
or they were filed late (after the conference) under extenuating circumstances.
Meanwhile the procedural dates set by the examiner had been revised
several times, finally specifying:

Submission and exchange of exhibits in chief-----------------.
September 24.
Submission and exchange of rebuttal exhibits ------------------------October 12.
H earing ---------------------------------------------------------------October 18.
Contemporaneously with the Board's order of October 2 on the petitions
for reconsideration, a notice by the examiner confirmed that hearings
would commence on October 18. Additional time, if needed, was to be
allowed on the newly added phases of the case. Despite some further procedural skirmishing, the hearings did commence on that date.
C. Formal Hearing And Positions On The Merits
The formal hearing consumed nine days, concluding on November 1.
The transcript engrossed 1,054 pages. There were filed in addition some
1,847 pages of exhibits.
On November 1, Eastern submitted a petition to the Board to reconsider the latter's consolidation order of October 2. The petition was de246E-10609 (Sept. 17, 1956), E-10647 (Sept. 28, 1956).
24'E-10651 (Oct. 2, 1956).
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nied on December 31 on the grounds (1) that some of the matters urged
were repetitious of arguments made in Eastern's prior petition for reconsideration, and (2) that other matters involved a collateral attack on interlocutory rulings of the examiner." '
After the conclusion of the hearings, briefs were submitted to the examiner. Pursuant to several requests, the deadline for filing these was extended to February 7, 1957. In all, seventeen briefs (and several letters)
were filed totaling 533 pages.
On the primary issue of whether additional air service was required between St. Louis and the Southeast, Eastern opposed all other applicants:
(1) Eastern made pessimistic projections from the traffic figures available and compared its low estimates with recent decisions in which the
Board had refused to authorize additional service in markets manifesting
similar or greater traffic potential. Contending that this was a marginal
route, Eastern argued that diversion of traffic revenues through a competitive authorization would jeopardize its ability to serve numerous smaller
communities which did not produce a profit. The other applicants made
more optimistic projections from the statistics, compared St. Louis-Southeast air service with the greater service available between other city-pairs
claimed to be comparable, and compared their high estimates of traffic
potential with recent Board decisions granting competitive air service in
markets with similar or lesser traffic potential. Similar arguments were
made as to other major city-pairs.
(2) The other applicants generally criticized the schedules of Eastern
in the St. Louis-Southeast market, the equipment used, and the alleged
failure of Eastern to adequately develop the market. Eastern maintained
that it had always provided service commensurate with the size of the
market, and in fact had anticipated market growth by maintenance of
excess capacity. This second argument was related to the first, since, if
Eastern was right, the existing traffic was about as much as could be expected if a new carrier were certificated. Whereas, if the other applicants
were correct, existing traffic figures were depressed and estimates for the
future would have to include a liberal allowance for the additional traffic
that would be generated by the better service and more intensive promotion borne of competition.
(3) Bureau Counsel ultimately sided with Eastern on this issue, contending (a) that the other applicants had failed to show that Eastern had
not developed the route's traffic potential, and (b) that the city-pairs compared with St. Louis-Southeast, which tended to indicate deficient service
in that market, were not shown to be comparable with the St. LouisSoutheast market in their pertinent economic characteristics, i.e., the
poorer traffic flows to and from St. Louis were as consistent with lack of
"community of interest" with the Southeast as with under-development of
traffic potential.
On choice of carrier, assuming a market sufficient to support at least
some additional service, there was, of course, a divergence of views. Putting to one side the many subsidiary disputes about the validity of carrier
estimates of traffic flows, costs, and scheduling possibilities, the various positions may be briefly outlined:
Braniff argued that it would be in a position to support the St. Louis24 8

E-10912 (Dec. 31, 1956).
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Southeast segment by traffic from the Twin Cities and Kansas City which
it was carrying into St. Louis under existing authorizations, and that passengers from these more remote cities would be convenienced by being able
to continue on to the Southeast after a stop in St. Louis. (The same argument was applicable on traffic from the Southeast to Kansas City and the
Twin Cities.) New one-carrier service would be made available between
the Southeast and such cities as Minneapolis-St. Paul, Kansas City, Des
Moines, and Omaha. Other applicants minimized this argument by contending (1) that the main stream of traffic from the Twin Cities to the
Southeast would continue to move via Chicago rather than St. Louis and
that proposals for improved service in this very market were pending in
other proceedings, and (2) that Braniff was carrying very little of the
St. Louis-Kansas City traffic. To this Braniff rejoined that its weakness on
the Kansas City-St. Louis and Twin Cities-St. Louis routes was due to the
lack of connecting traffic on those routes, which curtailed its scheduling
possibilities. This defect, Braniff argued, would be remedied by a St. LouisSoutheast authorization.
Delta argued that it was already authorized to serve most of the cities
involved in this proceeding, although not in all cases in the direction here
in issue, and that the grant of its application would greatly improve its
route structure, eliminating loose ends and facilitating flexibility in arranging schedules, service, and utilization of equipment. It contended,
moreover, that since the service involved was primarily "regional," i.e.,
covering service within the southeastern quadrant of the United Statesthe new authority should go to Delta as a carrier specializing in that
region. Finally, Delta argued that its historical participation in the traffic
involved was greater than that of any other applicant, exceeded only by
Eastern, and that its certification would mark the least disruption in
existing patterns-fewest new cities, least new mileage, and minimum disruption of historical patterns. In contrast the proposals of the other applicants would create additional competition, e.g., between Atlanta and Miami
-where none was shown to be needed. On the other hand, the route integration sought would permit a wide variety of scheduling, including coach
service and some new one-carrier service. The other applicants argued that
this proceeding was not concerned with remedying the defects of Delta's
route structure but with improving St. Louis-Southeast air service; and
that Delta's existing routes, while criss-crossing the area, contained no
substantial traffic flows which could be funneled into the main St. LouisSoutheastern market to support extensive services there or to add to existing travel conveniences of passengers entering that market from outside cities. Delta's historical participation was minimized by pointing to
Eastern's substantial monopoly of the traffic, making Delta's share merely
the highest of several inconsequential percentages. Moreover, one of Delta's
major interests-certification into Tampa-was at issue in the Great LakesSoutheast Service case.
National urged its selection on the grounds (1) that it proposed more
coach service than any of the other applicants, (2) that it was a specialist
in Florida traffic, serving more Florida cities than any other applicant, and
(3) that a recent Board decision, adding a competitor to a National route,
might leave National with more equipment than it could utilize. But National's main point was that, of all the trunklines, it was most in need of
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strengthening by additional route authority. It pointed to recent grants
of authority to the other small trunklines and to the reverse consequence
in its own case by reason of the certification of an additional competitor
on its important New York-Miami route. The St. Louis market was viewed
by National as one of the last remaining avenues for its expansion. Other
applicants, countered that an award to National would not necessarily
strengthen that carrier since the route in question was not a particularly
lucrative one, that National lacked any back-up traffic to support services
on the route, and that the seasonal nature of the route coincided with seasonal fluctuations on National's other routes, thereby aggravating the
variation in utilization of its equipment. Furthermore, they argued, these
same factors minimized the amount of new service that would be offered
by National, particularly since no service would be provided to any points
west of St. Louis. Finally, it was pointed out that National's revenues had
been ample compared to its investments, i.e., that its operations were quite
profitable.
TWA placed primary reliance on the new service its proposal would
provide between the Southeast and major cities west of St. Louis: first onecarrier service between Southeast points and Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Tulsa, Oklahoma City, and Kansas City. The addition of traffic to and
from these cities to traffic moving over the St. Louis-Southeast segment
would mean: (1) greater support for service between St. Louis and the
Southeast, and (2) improved service between the western cities and the
Southeast, more new one-carrier service than proposed by any other applicant. TWA also pointed out that present seasonal fluctuations in its
equipment utilization were the reverse of the seasonal demands of the
Florida traffic and accordingly that its selection here would permit improved utilization of equipment. The other applicants responded that
TWA was attempting to convert a St. Louis-Southeast case into a southern
transcontinental case and that, in any event, TWA would not be able to
attract much traffic between western cities and the Southeast because the
mandatory stop at St. Louis would make TWA's service less attractive
than transcontinental service being provided by interchange among a
number of other carriers.
Trans American (successor to North American) based its argument on
two factors: (1) its willingness to render coach service at fares lower than
any proposed by other applicants, and (2) the desirability of permitting
new entry into the trunkline industry. Its primary obstacle was an outstanding Board order finding that Trans American's constituents had engaged in violations of the statutory and regulatory scheme administered
by the CAB. Other applicants relied on this order in arguing that Trans
American was "unfit."
Eastern's affirmative proposals were limited to the "gaps" it desired to
close between Chattanooga and Birmingham and between St. Louis and
Memphis. Capital was the only carrier authorized to render service between
the first two; and Delta was the only one certificated between the second
two. Eastern argued that Capital and Delta had failed adequately to develop their respective routes; that the addition of Eastern would improve service between these two pairs of points; that Eastern would be
able to improve its long-haul services to the Southeast if these gaps were
closed, augmenting scheduling possibilities and routing flexibility; and that
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such improved flexibility would also permit better utilization of Eastern
equipment and personnel. Diversionary impacts on Capital and Delta were
estimated to be small. Even so, Capital and Delta objected to certification
of Eastern.
The positions of some of the interveners were as follows:
American was concerned because an award to TWA would permit service by that carrier between the Southeast and cities west of the Mississippi.
American was then participating in such traffic, either by direct service or
by interchange with other carriers, and argued that the traffic potential
was too small to support an additional carrier. American, therefore, advocated that any grant to TWA prohibit through-plane service between the
Southeast and the West.
Northwest was concerned about a grant to Braniff which would enable
that carrier to participate in traffic between the Twin Cities and the Southeast. Northwest was actively participating in such traffic by providing
service beween the Twin Cities and Chicago, where connections to the
Southeast were available. Northwest urged that any award to Braniff preclude through-plane service between the Twin Cities and the Southeast.
Northwest also had an application pending in the Great Lakes-Southeast
Service case to extend its Twin Cities-Chicago route to Miami.
Southern rendered local service between Memphis and Atlanta via Birmingham, and between Atlanta and Jacksonville. Portions of the applications of Delta and National duplicated these segments. Southern argued
that other routings between St. Louis and the Southeast would be preferable and would protect it against undue loss of revenues.
As noted, Capital objected to certification of Eastern as a competitor on
the Chattanooga-Birmingham segment.
Kansas City urged that it be permitted to benefit from improvement of
service between St. Louis and the Southeast by granting the application of
Delta or TWA, both of which were already authorized to render service
between Kansas City and St. Louis.
Evansville, included in the St. Louis-Southeast proposals of Delta and
National, expressed a preference for Delta because of the greater frequency
of service offered by the proposed schedules of that carrier.
Chattanooga asked to be included on any new St. Louis-Southeast route
and supported Eastern's Chattanooga-Birmingham proposal.
Memphis, included in the St. Louis-Southeast proposals of Delta, Braniff
and National, supported Delta because (1) Delta's service proposals were
more extensive, and (2) Delta's certification would make Memphis a gateway for traffic between Kansas City and the Southeast.

Birmingham complained of service deficiencies to St. Louis, Chattanooga,
Nashville, and Memphis, and supported Delta's application because it offered the greatest quantity of service.
Jacksonville desired competitive air service to Nashville, Memphis, and
St. Louis.

The major cities involved-St. Louis, Nashville, Atlanta, Tampa, and
Miami-urged the need for additional air service but expressed no marked
preference for one applicant over another, except for Atlanta's desire for

Delta's more attractive schedules. They emphasized their community of
interest with one another. A number of large and small cities located on
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Delta's route supported that carrier's application in order to insure better
service for themselves.
Bureau Counsel argued that there was no need for any new service and
contended that all applications should be denied. If, however, an award
was to be made, the choice of Delta was said to involve the least new competition since Delta was already certificated to serve Chattanooga-Atlanta,
Birmingham-Atlanta, and Atlanta-Jacksonville-Miami.
With the submission of briefs on February 7, 1957, the case stood ready
for decision by the examiner. One further detour was provided by Eastern

which, in a motion filed on May 7, sought to reopen the record to include
information on the financial and traffic results of its recent operations in

the St. Louis-Southeast markets. Answers in opposition were filed by St.
Louis, TWA, and Delta. And on July 2 the examiner summarily denied
Eastern's motion.

D. Initial Decision And Subsequent Maneuvering
12,
1957, the hearing examiner rendered his initial decision, a
On July
document running 129 pages in the record."4 9 After noting briefly the
procedural framework of the case, the examiner proceeded to describe: (1)
the cities involved in the proceeding, their economic characteristics, their
air service, and their views with respect to new air service; (2) the proposals of the applicants, including their arguments for being preferred over
competing applicants; (3) the arguments of applicants, incumbent, and
Bureau Counsel concerning the need for new service in the St. LouisSoutheast market; and (4) the objections of interveners. Statements of
fact-apparent subsidiary findings-were so intermingled with statements
of the parties' contentions, that it was difficult to tell which statements
were accepted by the examiner. But the examiner made clear his ultimate
conclusions, to the effect that:
(1) Additional air service was warranted over a route encompassing St.
Louis, Nashville, Atlanta, Tampa, and Miami. As to other cities within
the area, the available traffic was found to be insufficient to support new
service except as servicing might result under existing authorizations. But
as to the basic St. Louis-Southeast route the examiner found that there was
sufficient traffic, independent of any back-up traffic, to support an additional carrier, and that Eastern had not adequately developed the route.
The diversion in revenues that Eastern would sustain was not considered
to be a threat to that carrier's financial position.
(2) The carrier to render this basic service should be National. The
projected beyond-area benefits advanced by Braniff and TWA were minimized by the examiner on the grounds suggested by the other applicants.
And as between Delta and National, the examiner found that National
had the greater need for route strengthening because of recent route
awards to Delta and the confined character of National's route pattern.
Trans American was found to be unfit because of prior Board orders based
on previous violations by members of the Trans American group.
(3) Additional authority should also be granted to Eastern between
St. Louis and Memphis and between Chattanooga and Birmingham, and to
Delta between Memphis and Birmingham. These awards were based on
the opportunities for route improvement afforded by the closing of "gaps"
27 C.A.B. 370 (1958).
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in these carriers' route structures, and were deemed to meet the justifiable
complaints of the cities affected.
Exceptions to the examiner's decision were filed during July by twenty
of the parties to the proceeding. On August 5, TWA moved to strike
portions of Eastern's exceptions which embodied some of the recent operating data that Eastern had unsuccessfully sought to inject by its effort
to reopen the proceeding. Delta and St. Louis supported TWA's motion.
On August 28 and 29 notices relating to oral argument before the Board
were promulgated, supplemented by a further notice on September 4 setting oral argument for September 19. By reason of an earlier notice by the
examiner, briefs were due on September 9.
Briefs to the Board were filed by nineteen parties, and letters were submitted by two others; together with the exceptions they totaled 576 pages.
Oral argument before the Board consumed seven hours on September 19
and 20 and ran for 219 pages. In addition, some forty pages of materials
were submitted for use in connection with oral argument. The pressure of
work prevented the General Council's office from preparing its usual
Memorandum of Issues.
During the course of the argument Northwest requested that the Board
defer its decision in this case for contemporaneous consideration with the
pending Great Lakes-Southeast Service case. By order dated October 18,
the Board granted the request on the ground that both cases involved
service between Atlanta and Florida (the stem of a fork with one prong
reaching to St. Louis and the other to the Great Lakes area), and that their
contemporaneous consideration would facilitate a sound decision in both
cases."' Petitions for reconsideration of this order were filed by Delta and
Eastern, each asking different relief, and they were supported by several
cities. They provoked in turn responses by National, Braniff, TWA, Northwest, and Capital, who urged that the petitions be denied or, in the alternative, that they be stricken to the extent that they involved a reargument
of the merits. Several additional exchanges on this subject concluded on
December 11, 1957, without the benefit of any decision by the Board on
the various petitions, answers, motions, and letters.
Another exchange took place in May and June of 1958 when Eastern
sought once more to reopen the record for recently developed operating
data; replies were filed by Northwest and TWA.
At about this time a dramatic succession of events occurred which altered considerably the orientation of the proceeding. On March 26 and 31,
1958, the Board announced in several press releases its tentative decision
in the St. Louis-Southeast case, making the primary grant to TWA to
render service between St. Louis and Miami via Nashville, Atlanta, and
Tampa. At about the same time, March 24, the Board instituted the
Houston-West Service case,"' an investigation into the need for improved
service between Houston and California and for first one-carrier service
between Florida and California via New Orleans and Texas points. On
April 21, TWA amended a pending application so as to propose a southern
transcontinental route of the type described and moved to consolidate it
into the Houston-West case. And on August 5 the Board issued an order"'"
enlarging the scope of the Houston-West case into a Southern Transcon0

25 E-11888 (Oct. 18, 1957).
5'E-12257 (March 24, 1958).
25'E-12861 (Aug. 5, 1958).
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tinental Service case."' Encompassing points in Georgia and Florida in the
East, and California in the West, via intermediate points in Alabama,
Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada; at the same time
the Board deferred decision with respect to the Dallas-California portion
of the pending Dallas to the West Service case..4 and consolidated that
portion with the Southern Transcontinental case. In all, nine applications
were consolidated at this time. The announcement of the result in the St.
Louis-Southeast case and the almost simultaneous birth of the Southern
Transcontinentalcase set the stage for the next round of controversy.
On August 8, Delta moved to defer consideration of TWA's application
in the St. Louis-Southeast case for contemporaneous consideration with the
applications pending in the Southern Transcontinentalcase. On August 12,
American moved to dismiss so much of TWA's application as permitted
through-service beyond St. Louis to the West Coast or, in the alternative, to
defer TWA's application for comparative hearing and contemporaneous
consideration with applications pending in the Southern Transcontinental
case. Answers in opposition were filed by TWA, Eastern, and a number of
communities. On September 29, the Board dismissed the motions on the
ground that they were, in essence, an attempt to obtain reconsideration of
the Board's press release and that, as such, they were prematurely filed.""
Finally, on September 30 the Board issued its formal opinion in the St.
Louis-Southeast case, confirming the awards announced in its press release." At the time of this decision the record totaled 5,169 pages. The
General Counsel's request for instructions from the Board was 1 '2 pages
in length.
E. Board Decision And First Reconsideration
In its opinion, the Board agreed with the examiner on several points: (1)
that a St. Louis-Nashville-Atlanta-Tampa-Miami routing should be granted
to one of the applicants; (2) that Delta should be granted the BirminghamMemphis segment; and (3) that Eastern should be granted the Chattanooga-Birmingham segment. But the Board disagreed with the new authority granted to Eastern between Memphis and St. Louis and, as previously indicated, it chose TWA as the carrier to render the basic new
service between St. Louis and the Southeast. In making this selection, the
Board emphasized (1) the amount of new one-carrier service TWA would
provide between the Southeast and cities west of the Mississippi, and (2)
the relationship between the seasonal demands of the new route and the
complementary seasonal characteristics of TWA's existing system.
American had argued that TWA should be prohibited from providing
through-plane service between the Southeast and the West Coast because,
in the absence of a restriction against such service, TWA would be in a
position to render southern transcontinental service in preference to carriers whose applications were pending in the Southern Transcontinental
Service case. The Board rejected the argument, pointing out (1) that service between St. Louis and the Southeast was found to be required without
regard to any transcontinental aspects, (2) that TWA's beyond-area advantages were the kind traditionally taken into account in making a selec2' Concluded, E-16500 (March 13, 1961), appeal pending.
'54Concluded, E-14334 (Aug. 10, 1959).
"5E-13023 (Sept. 29, 1958).

"27 C.A.B. 342 (1958).
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tion among competing applicants, and (3) that the transcontinental service TWA might render, with a mandatory stop at St. Louis, was materially
different from direct one-carrier service between Florida and the West
Coast. The Board affirmed "that the availability of TWA's service via St.
Louis would not in any real sense preclude a finding of public need for a
more direct routing. . . .Our grant to TWA .. .does not in any way
prejudge the merits of the proposals of the various applicants in the

Southern Transcontinental case.""'
The rejection of competing applications was based largely on arguments
previously advanced by their adversaries.
As to National, the Board observed that strengthening of weaker carriers was but one of many factors to be considered and that National
would not be particularly strengthened by a route that dead-ended at St.
Louis. It should be noted, further, that about this time (February 8) a
subsidiary of National was exposed as a participant in the Florida, Channel
10 television scandal.
As to Braniff, the Board observed that the Twin Cities support on which
it had relied had been further diluted by a grant to Northwest in the
Great Lakes-Southeast Service case. Already authorized between the Twin
Cities and Chicago, Northwest was granted an extension from Chicago to
Miami via Atlanta, thereby fortifying its hold on Twin Cities-Florida
traffic.
With regard to Delta, the Board noted that, as a result of the grant here
of the Birmingham-Memphis segment and the addition of Tampa to its
route in the Great Lakes-Southeast Service case, most of the new service
benefits upon which Delta had relied could be furnished without granting
it direct St. Louis-Southeast authority. Indeed, in view of Delta's new authority it became necessary to require Delta to serve Birmingham, in addition to the junction points of Memphis and Atlanta, on all flights serving
St. Louis or Kansas City, on the one hand, and Florida points on the other.
Otherwise Delta would have constituted a third competitor for St. LouisFlorida traffic.
Eastern's two applications met with divergent treatments. On the
Chattanooga-Birmingham segment, the benefit to Eastern's route structure was deemed to outweigh the diversionary impact on Capital, particularly in light of Capital's poor service. On the St. Louis-Memphis segment, the diversionary impact on Delta was held to outweigh the benefit
to Eastern's route structure, apparently because Delta had rendered good
service. Eastern's motion to reopen the record was denied.
Three members of the Board concurred in the majority opinion. One
member concurred in the awards to Delta and Eastern but dissented on
the award to TWA on the ground that no need had been shown for additional service in the St. Louis-Southeast market, particularly in view of
the Great Lakes-Southeast decisions, which had added two carriers to the
existing two carriers in the Atlanta-Florida market. Another member came
to the same result, emphasizing the marginal character of the St. LouisSoutheast market and the effect of the TWA award on the Southern Transcontinental case. However, he would not have required Delta to make a
mandatory stop at Birmingham, thereby permitting that carrier to participate in the St. Louis-Southeast traffic.
..
'27 C.A.B. 351 (1958).
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The Board's opinions totaled thrity-seven pages in the record.
The Board's order provided that the new operating authority was to
become effective on November 29, 1958. Petitions for reconsideration and
other relief were filed by American, Delta, Eastern, National, and a number of civic participants. Numerous answers were filed, as well as some
motions addressed to these filings. On November 21 the Board postponed
the effective date of the new certificates to December 15 because of the
pendency of the petitions for reconsideration." 8 And on December 8 the
Board issued its Supplemental Opinion and Order on Reconsideration
making a minor change in a restriction on Delta's new authority and otherwise rejecting the petitions for reconsideration."' The opinion, twenty-four
pages in length, was addressed primarily to arguments of the carrier participants that the Board's awards to TWA and Delta deprived competing
applications of comparative consideration, i.e., those seeking southern
transcontinental service and Eastern's Memphis-Kansas City proposal.
TWA's certificate became effective on December 16 and it commenced
service over the new route.

F. JudicialReview
Petitions to review the Board's order were filed by American, Delta,
Eastern, and National. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on December 10, 1959.20 While rejecting summarily all arguments directed to
the merits of the awards to TWA and Delta, the Court considered in great
detail objections to the scope of the proceeding.
All four petitioners challenged the award to TWA on the ground that
it constituted a southern transcontinental route which they had also
sought. Petitioners argued that, instead of being relegated to the Southern
Transcontinental proceeding, their applications should have been given
comparative consideration with that of TWA in the St. Louis-Southeast
case. The Court agreed (at least as to three of the four petitioners) and
found that prima facie the Board by its award had transformed the limited
area proceeding into a southern transcontnental case; that the mandatory
stop at St. Louis did not preclude TWA from becoming an effective competitor for transcontinental traffic; and, therefore, that the grant to TWA
might prejudice some or all of the southern transcontinental applications.
The Board was given three ways in which to remedy the defect: (1) it
could condition the award to TWA so as to preclude it from becoming an
effective transcontinental carrier; (2) it could hold an evidentiary hearing
to buttress its announced conclusion that the award to TWA could not
exclude any southern transcontinental awards; or (3) it could reopen the
proceeding to hold a comparative hearing on all transcontinental applications.
The award of the Memphis-Birmingham segment to Delta was challenged by Eastern. Eastern contended that this permitted Delta to render
Kansas City-Memphis-Southeast service, the very authority Eastern sought
to secure by its Kansas City-Memphis application, which had been excluded
from the proceeding. On this phase of the case the Court sustained the

Board, finding a necessity that the Board be in a position to restrict the
25
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'0Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 969
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scope of its proceedings to manageable proportions. In reconciling this conclusion with its apparently contrary holding on the transcontinental
phase, the Court observed: "The expansion of an area case by adding a
little additional segment outside the area is quite a different thing from
awarding a transcontinental certificate in a limited area case. The former
is an expansion of a limited case. The latter is a transformation of the real
nature of the proceedings.""2 1
On May 2, 1960, TWA's petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied.262

G. Board Decision On Remand
The next action of the Board took place on May 9."' Acting on a request filed by TWA on April 18, the Board granted a thirty-day exemption to prevent interruption in TWA's St. Louis-Southeast services. Rejecting the opposition of Delta and Eastern, the Board conditioned the
exemption on a change of planes at St. Louis. On May 17 an order issued
setting oral argument on the remanded case for May 26 and specifying the
issues the Board thought to be significant." The Board's ability to act was
handicapped by the fact that of the five members who originally had decided the case only the two dissenters remained. Oral argument actually
took place on June 3, and on June 8 the Board extended TWA's exemption to July 31 26'
On July 29, 1960, the Board issued its Supplemental Opinion and Order
in the St. Louis-Southeast case. 6" Reaffirming its decision on need for the
service and selection of TWA to render the service, the Board turned to
limiting TWA's transcontinental operations in accordance with the mandate of the Court. The Board required that, on transcontinental flights,
TWA must change planes at either St. Louis or Kansas City. This created
three problems:
First, this requirement seemed to conflict with the basis of the Board's
original selection of 'TWA: the integration of the St. Louis-Southeast segment with TWA's route west of St. Louis. The Board concluded that,
even though single-plane service between the Southeast and the West Coast
was no longer a supporting consideration, TWA was still the best choice because of: (1) seasonal integration of operations, (2) single-plane service
between Kansas City and the Southeast, and (3) availability of back-up
traffic west of Kansas City which, despite the change of plane, could be
funneled into the St. Louis-Southeast market to support service there.
Second, it was disputed that this requirement was sufficient to comply
with the mandate of the court without also establishing a connecting time
more prolonged than the forty to forty-five minutes then being used by
TWA under its exemption authority. It was argued, further, that to the
extent TWA could rely on back-up traffic beyond Kansas City, it was a
transcontinental competitor. The Board rejected the contention, finding
that the circuity, delay, and change of plane involved in TWA transcontinental flights made its competitive impact on the transcontinental market "minimal."
261 275 F.2d 632, 644.
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Third, a new Ashbacker objection was injected when Eastern contended
that one of its transcontinental applications, which had been refused consolidation, involved a St. Louis-Kansas City segment which was mutually
exclusive with the single-plane Kansas City-Southeast service permitted by
the Board's order. Relying on the Court's decision on the Memphis-Birmingham award to Delta, the Board held that it had discretion to reject
consolidation of Eastern's beyond-area application even though the award
to TWA permitted the service sought by Eastern.
On the first and second points, one member of the Board dissented. On
the third point Eastern filed a petition for reconsideration, which, together
with a Delta petition, was denied on October 11, 1960."' The opinions on
remand ran some twenty-four pages. The St. Louis-Southeast Service case
was finally over.
H. Concluding Notes
Two postscripts may be in order:
First, TVA's passengers between the Southeast and the West Coast are
still going through the tiresome ritual of changing planes at St. Louis or
Kansas City. The Board's files include inquiries from passengers who used
TWA's through-plane service in 1959 and express some understandable
ire with the subsequent requirement of changing planes.
Second, the Board decided the Southern Transcontinental Service case
on March 13, 1961, awarding two new transcontinental routes, one to National and one to Delta. " ' TWA's application was summarily rejected on
the grounds that it lacked any historic interest in Florida-West Coast
traffic and that its certification would result in excessive competition with
National's trans-Gulf operations.
As concluded, the record in the St. Louis-Southeast case filled eleven

volumes.
IX.

STUDIES OF PROCESSING TIME AND VOLUME OF
LICENSING MATTERS

The St. Louis-Southeast case is but one proceeding. Additional informa-

tion is required in order to place that case in perspective. How does it
compare with other major route proceedings in length and complexity?

Among other things, the following discussion should permit a comparison
with the St. Louis-Southeast case and facilitate a more realistic estimate
of the nature and magnitude of the Board's licensing proceedings.
In fiscal 1961, six major route proceedings (not counting St. LouisSoutheast) were closed by the Board: one trunkline case, four local service area cases, and one case substituting local for trunkline service. ' For
reasons indicated elsewhere, the intervals between the filing of the various
applications and the prehearing conference are not meaningful measures of

processing time. In the six cases here considered, applications were included which were almost nine years old at the time of the prehearing con2 67

E-15904 (Oct. 11, 1960).
26'E-16500 (March 13, 1961), reversed in part, Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 7 Avi. 18,145
(1962).
"9Southeastern Area Local Service Investigation, 25 C.A.B. 819 (1957); Northeastern States
Area Investigation, E-14294 (July 31, 1959); Cincinnati-Detroit Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 63
(1960); Pacific-Northwest Local Service Investigation, 29 C.A.B. 660 (1959); Great Lakes Local
Service Investigation, 24 C.A.B. 813 (1956); Southern Transcontinental Service case, E-16500
(March 13, 1961).
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ference; others were filed at the conference or shortly before. These time
intervals are therefore excluded. Also omitted are intervals required by
judicial review or evidentiary hearings on reopened portions. Working
within these limitations, a composite picture of the six major route cases,
from the prehearing conference to the final Board order, discloses the following time intervals:
From prehearing conference to the examiner's original report of the
conference, 1.2 months elapsed; from the examiner's report to the Board's
first consolidation order, another two months; from the first consolidation
order to the Board's final consolidation order, an additional 4.4 months;
from the final consolidation order to the start of the evidentiary hearing,
another 2.2 months. The total time consumed prior to the evidentiary hearing averaged 9.8 months. The time required to finally determine the scope
of the proceedings amounted to 7.6 months."'
From the beginning of the evidentiary hearing to its conclusion an average of 2.9 months elapsed. During this period an average of thirty-three
days were actually devoted to evidentiary hearings.
From the conclusion of the formal hearing, the examiner took 10.9
months to prepare his initial decision.
The Board's decision, on review of exceptions to the examiner's report,
was issued 10.6 months later. It took another 6.4 months to dispose of
petitions for reconsideration. The total time required from prehearing conference to final Board action averaged three years and five months.
A number of other sources indicate that these are typical figures. Thus
the Board's own budget personnel compiled averages based on seventy per
cent of the route cases closed in the five-year period 1956 through 1960,
excluding extreme or typical cases. The averages obtained for major route
cases were:
One year from prehearing conference to completion of the hearing
(almost identical to fiscal 1961) ;
Fifteen months from conclusion of the hearing to the initial decision
(10.9 months for fiscal 1961);
Thirteen months from initial decision to Board decision (10.6 months
for fiscal 1961).
It is useful, in reviewing the time required to decide these cases, to simultaneously consider their complexity. The six cases used to construct a
composite for fiscal 1961 each involved on the average:
Thirty-three applications sought to be consolidated;
Seventeen applications actually consolidated, four by civic interests and
the remainder by six carrier applicants;
Seventy interveners, six of them carriers and the remainder civic interests;
An initial decision of 210 pages, two days of oral argument before the
Board, and one or more Board opinions totaling 113 pages; and
A total of some twenty-eight volumes.
As compared with these proceedings, the St. Louis-Southeast case stands
at the less complex end of the spectrum of major route cases. Only 32.5
months were consumed between the prehearing conference and the final
Board order prior to judicial review; only thirty-odd parties were involved;
and the record was a mere eleven volumes.
270 The evidentiary hearing is sometimes commenced before the scope of the proceeding is
finally determined.

DOMESTIC LICENSING: THE CAB

Recognizing the complexity of major route cases is of some importance.
If, for example, the 106 applications actually consolidated in the six major
route cases under discussion were each credited with a pro rata share of
the 246 months required to dispose of the six proceedings, the time allotted
to each application would be only 2.3 months. This compares favorably
with the time required to dispose of "simpler" route cases, those concerned
with only one or a few applications.
In fiscal 1961, there were six proceedings that might be considered minor
route cases (including two reopened portions of major route cases). '
They each required an average of 15.7 months to conclude; and if credit
is given for multiple applications in several proceedings, the pro rata share
of the total time applicable to each application is 9.4 months. The Board's
budget study for 1956 through 1960, previously referred to, indicates that
seventeen months is typical for minor route cases (exclusive of the reconsideration stage).
Route cases closed in fiscal 1961 have been deemed to encompass six
major and six minor route proceedings. This is a fairly representative figure, somewhat better than fiscal 1960 and not quite as high as fiscal 1959.
The Board's classification of "closed" proceedings, based on the initial
Board decision on the merits, does not coincide with the one used herewhich treats as "closed" only those cases in which petitions for reconsideration have been disposed of and deferred portions have been resolved (even
through deferred portions requiring evidentiary hearings were treated as
separate cases for purposes of time studies). The Board's classification of
"route cases" is also somewhat broader in that it includes suspensions, renewals, international applications, and other types of proceedings excluded from this study of initial licensing of domestic air transport. Even
so, the Board's figures are useful if compared with one another over a
period of time. For the fiscal years 1947 through 1961, the Board's dispositions of route matters, including dismissals, was as follows:
Fiscal year

Pending at
start

1947 ___ ___
798
1948______.
968
1949. ........
..
69 1
1950-...
607
1951
546
1952
...........429
1953_ _ _____
604
1954- - -668

Received Disposed of
during
during
year
year
475
165
1 55
147
130
297
218
135

305
442
239
208
247
122
154
73

Fiscal year

Pending at
start

1955 ..............730
1956 ----803
19 57 _ ___ _ ___
97 2
1958_.....
1,032
1959
1,146
1960----- -957
1961 ..............
1,032
1962____ _..
793

Received Disposed of
during
during
year
year
203
360
19 5
202
171
194
159

130
191
135
88
360
119
'398

1 Included about 200 dismissals of a nonrecurring nature.

Also during fiscal 1961 the following applications for operating authority were disposed of by informal procedures:
Exemptions --------------------------..........
112
Service pattern changes -------------.
12
Airport notices ..................
-......... 126
Charter authorizations
26
211 Pittsburgh-Syracuse Investigation, E-16412 (Feb. 21, 1961); Wheeling-New York Nonstop
case, Doc. No. 9934; Sarasota-Bradenton Investigation, E-15974 (Oct. 31, 1960); Lake Central
Airlines, Temporary Intermediate Points, E-16908 (June 7, 1961); Application of Vance Roberts
d/b/a Northwest Air Service, E-15930 (Oct. 18, 1960); reopened Pacific-Northwest Local Air
Service case (Sacramento to Reno), E-15913 (Oct. 12, 1960).
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The docket on informal matters is fairly current; there is virtually no
backlog. But the formal docket is quite another matter. An examination
of that docket as of November 30, 1961,272 reveals that there were then
pending 681 applications for domestic operating authority. Of these, 188
applications in thirteen separate cases were before the Board for its decision, including some that were being held for other matters or were
awaiting the enactment of pending legislation. Another seventy-two applications involved in a single proceeding were the subject of an initial
decision recently served. Hearings had been held on another forty applications involved in three proceedings; and prehearing steps had been taken
with regard to forty-five more applications embraced in twelve cases.
This left 336 applications which were simply "awaiting action." These
were encompassed in the following categories:
Domestic conventional aircraft-

F iled betw een 194 6 an d 19 52
-------------------------------------------------8
F iled b etween 19 53 an d 19 5 5 -------------------------------------------------------32

Filed in 1956 and 195729
Filed in 1958 and 1959----------------------------------49
Filed in 1960 ------------------------------------------------------------54
Filed in 1961 -------------------------------------------------------.----51
Domestic helicopter aircraft, the earliest pending since 1946
77
Alaska authority, the earliest since 1952 and most since 195 814
Nonscheduled authority, 1 since 1954 and most since 1959
---------------5
M iscellaneous formal route matters ------------------------------------------------17
Of significance is the fact that the largest numbers of pending applications are concentrated at the two extremes of the licensing process: either
they had reached the Board for decision (or were about to) or they were
simply awaiting action. The number of applications recently committed
to the hearing process is relatively small. This is not wholly accidental. The
general sentiment at the Board favors the view that outstanding domestic
air transport authorizations are generally ample; that new licensing will
proceed henceforth at a diminished rate; and that, in view of the poor
financial condition of the industry, the present need is for a contraction
of outstanding authorizations through route suspensions and amendments
and through approvals of mergers and route transfers. Whether this is a
relatively permanent fixture of contemporary CAB operations, or merely
the pessimistic phase of a cyclical development, is difficult to say. It is clear,
however, that the rate at which domestic route applications are processed
in the near future will depend upon Board attitudes concerning the substantive policies underlying the granting of new authorizations.
It is entirely possible that the major route proceeding, which has been
a source of so much anguish and study, is in large measure a thing of the
past; and that future route cases will concentrate on minor adjustments
to the route pattern rather than over-all review of large geographical areas
and interrelated markets of substantial proportions. But a resurgence of
traffic growth and industry profits could well lead to a return to ambitious
licensing-and enlarged proceedings-with all of the problems they encompass.
272Bureau of Hearing Examiners, Docket Section, Report of Formal Economic Proceedings as
of Nov. 30, 1961 (1961).

